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At the beginning Chief Justice Marshall described the federal com-
merce power with a breadth never yet exceeded. . . . He made
emphatic the embracing and penetrating nature of this power by
warning that effective restraints on its exercise must proceed from
political rather than from judicial processes.
-Justice Jackson'
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA)
was enacted on March 23, 2010.2 Since then, the constitutionality of the
PPACA has been the subject of conflicting rulings in the courts,3 a
source of major public criticism in the media,' and debate among legal
academics.' Even though the PPACA faces challenges on a number of
legal grounds,6 the one drawing the greatest amount of public attention
centers on the requirement-popularly known as the "individual man-
date"-that most Americans purchase health insurance. The individual
mandate has been challenged on the ground that Congress's power under
Article I of the Constitution to regulate interstate commerce does not
extend to requiring the purchase of health insurance. Given the immense
political and practical significance of the PPACA, any Supreme Court
resolution of this issue will almost certainly constitute a major event in
the history of the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence.'
In particular, this note focuses on three distinctions that have
played key roles in debates over the mandate's constitutionality. The
first distinction-and most important-is one between activity and inac-
tivity. Critics of the PPACA assert that Congress does not have power
under the Commerce Clause to regulate "inactivity," and that the man-
2. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, with a
Flourish, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2010, at A19.
3. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-CV-91-
RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (striking down the PPACA as
unconstitutional at the District Court); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D.
Va. 2010) (upholding the constitutionality of the PPACA); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius,
728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 778-79 (E.D. Va. 2010) (striking down the PPACA because it forces
individual into a market regulated by Congress).
4. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, A Question of Fairness Among States, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 2010, at A16.
5. See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey & Jack M. Balkin, Debate, A Healthy
Debate: The Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate, 158 U. PA. L. REv. PENNUMBRA 93
(2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/HealthyDebate.pdf (debating the
constitutionality of the PPACA); Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the
Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 581, 626-29
(2010) (concluding that the PPACA is unconstitutional as enacted). Additionally, there have also
been legislative attempts to repeal the PPACA. See, e.g., Revoke Excessive Policies that Encroach
on American Liberties (REPEAL) Act of 2011, H.R. 145, 112th Cong. (2011).
6. See, e.g., Liberty Univ., 753 F. Supp. 2d at 641-44 (challenge under the Free Exercise
Clause and Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., 720 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1156-61 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (challenge under the Tenth
Amendment of coercion and commandeering); Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., No. 3:10-CV-91-RV/EMT, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55270, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Apr.
23, 2010) (challenge that "the Act is invalid because Obama was purportedly not born in the
United States, so he is ineligible to be President and could not sign the bill into law").
7. See infra Part III.A.
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date represents a regulation of such inactivity.' The second distinction is
one between voluntary and involuntary participation in commerce. Crit-
ics of the individual mandate claim that Congress lacks the power to
force people to enter the market and purchase a good or service.9 The
third distinction turns on the alleged presence of unique circumstances.
In contrast to the first two, both sides of the debate invoke this distinc-
tion. Critics of the PPACA argue that the mandate is an unprecedented,
unique exercise of congressional powers-imposing a requirement
"simply for being alive"-and take this uniqueness to make the mandate
questionable at root.o Supporters of the PPACA claim that Congress
determined that regulation of the health care market poses unique regu-
latory challenges, which the mandate can resolve only if the judiciary
exercises restraint and does not second-guess Congress."
None of these distinctions, this note will argue, holds up under
close analysis. More important, their introduction as key distinctions in
the analysis of Congress's Commerce Clause power is unsupported by
the text of the Constitution or existing case law. And most important,
they represent an effort to import into the Commerce Clause a notion
like the conception of individual liberty rights in the Lochner era.12
The Commerce Clause, however, is not about protecting individual
liberty-at least not directly. Its central function is to maintain an appro-
priate balance between federal and state authority." Maintaining that
balance may indirectly protect individual liberty by countering the
8. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 5; Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *21 (holding that the
individual mandate is unconstitutional because it regulates inactivity).
9. See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 778-79 (E.D. Va.
2010) (holding that the individual mandate is unconstitutional because it forces individual into a
market regulated by Congress).
10. See, e.g., Brief of Petitioner-Appellee at 19, Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., No. 3:10-CV-91-RV/EMT (11th Cir. May 4, 2011) ("Simply for being alive, an
individual, by federal directive, must purchase qualifying health insurance. . . ."); see also Barnett,
supra note 5, at 626-29 (claiming that the individual mandate is an unprecedented threat to
individual liberty).
11. See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 34,
Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-CV-91-RV/EMT,
2010 WL 4564357, at *34 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2010) ("[I]t is the job of Congress, not the courts, to
determine the appropriate response to an unprecedented economic crisis in the health care market
that accounts for one sixth of the American economy. Once Congress has made that
determination, be it novel or not, the Court must accord it substantial deference.") (emphasis
added).
12. See Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REv. 1, 42 (2010) [hereinafter Balkin,
Commerce] ("The Lochner-era Court viewed manufacturing and labor relations as traditional
areas of state regulation.").
13. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574-79 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(discussing the "imprecision of content-based boundaries" in finding the "federal and state
balance").
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potential tyranny of an overly centralized government. 14 It may also, as
Justice Kennedy claims, promote democracy by ensuring political
accountability through demarcation of federal and state authority.' 5
Importing the protection of liberty rights directly into the Com-
merce Clause is another matter entirely, however. It would lead to a
grave mismatch between the Commerce Clause and its functions. Sup-
pose, for example, that the PPACA included a provision outlawing the
sale of books critical of the new health care plan. Because there is a
national market for the purchase and sale of books, its regulation would
plainly fall within Congress's Commerce Clause power. Holding other-
wise out of a concern to protect individuals from federally imposed cen-
sorship would leave them unprotected from state-imposed censorship.
The true constitutional barrier to any such requirement would lie in the
First Amendment, which applies to states as well as the federal
government.16
Similarly, if a mandate to buy and eat broccoli represents the kind
of threat to individual liberty that a Florida District Court believed it to
pose," the constitutionality of the mandate should not turn on whether it
is the federal or the state government embracing the role of the "nanny
state," to use a term favored by libertarians.'" A mandate to buy goods
or services would, in this view, be equally threatening if enacted by a
state government-as Massachusetts did in the case of health insur-
ance.' 9 Yet unless it is radically reinterpreted, the Commerce Clause
14. The fundamental concern of the Commerce Clause is to maintain the appropriate
allocation of power between the federal government and the state. See id. at 574 (discussing the
"subject of the federal and state balance").
15. Id. at 576 ("The theory that two governments accord more liberty than one requires for its
realization two distinct and discernable lines of political accountability: one between the citizens
and the Federal Government; the second between the citizens and the States.").
16. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996) (noting that the
First Amendment is made applicable to the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
17. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida drew a comparison
between a mandate to buy and eat broccoli and the PPACA's individual mandate to maintain
minimum health insurance coverage. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., No. 3:10-CV-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *24 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011)
(questioning whether "Congress could require that people buy and consume broccoli at regular
intervals"); id. (noting that such a requirement could pose "personal liberty" issues (quoting Dean
Chemerinsky)).
18. See, e.g., David Bergland, Libertarianism, Natural Rights and the Constitution: A
Commentary on Recent Libertarian Literature, 44 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 499, 505 (1996).
19. In 2008, Massachusetts enacted a statute imposing a required minimum level of health
insurance coverage. See MASS. STAT. Trr. 16 ch. 111 M, § 2 (2008) (requiring individuals over the
age of eighteen to "obtain and maintain creditable coverage" subject to certain exemptions). Both
the PPACA and the Massachusetts statute enforce the requirement by imposing a penalty on
individuals who fail to meet the required amount of health insurance coverage, which is imposed
through taxes. Compare I.R.C. § 5000A(a) (West 2010) (imposing a penalty through an
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would have nothing to say about a state mandate, for it limits the powers
of Congress-not the states.20
In short, if there is any constitutional impediment to an individual
mandate to buy health insurance, it arises from some substantive due
process right not to do so. As this note will show, the case for such a
right is far from clear. What is incontestable, however, is that analysis of
that question is not aided by attempts to amalgamate it with the core
federalism concerns of the Commerce Clause.21
Part II of this note explains key provisions of the PPACA and the
legal challenges it faces. Part III analyzes the constitutionality of the
PPACA under the Commerce Clause by discussing relevant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, emphasizing the importance of the current chal-
lenges to the PPACA, and then explaining why the new distinctions in
the Commerce Clause challenges to the PPACA are improper. Part IV
explains the misconceived new distinctions as exemplifying the liberty
claim underlying the constitutional challenges to the PPACA. This note
concludes that under well-settled Commerce Clause doctrine governing
the balance between federal and state power, the federal power surely
encompasses the regulation of a multi-billion dollar market in private
health insurance. Thus, the individual mandate provisions of the PPACA
should be upheld.
II. THE PPACA AND THE LEGAL CHALLENGES IT FACES
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 has been
individual's tax return), with MASS. STAT. TIT. 16 ch. I llM, § 2 (2008) (imposing a penalty as a
loss of personal tax exemption).
20. The Dormant Commerce Clause-as inferred by the Court from the power granted to
Congress in Article I-does limit powers reserved to the states, but there is no reason to believe a
state mandate would fail under the Court's balancing test. See Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S.
117, 125-29 (1978) (upholding a facially neutral state law). In any event, Congress has the power
to authorize any state law found by the Court to violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, so any
conceivable judicial invalidation of a state law mandate would not provide any liberty protection.
See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992). Significantly, in setting out limits to
state taxation of interstate commerce, the Court has emphasized that rights protection (in the form
of due process) should be kept separate from federalism concerns. See id. at 312 ("Due process
centrally concerns the fundamental fairness of governmental activity. . . . In contrast, the
Commerce Clause and its nexus requirement are informed not so much by concerns about fairness
for the individual defendant as by structural concerns about the effects of state regulation on the
national economy."). Even though it would be logically possible to do so, it would be odd to
import individual rights into the Commerce Clause in determining the scope of Congress's power
to regulate interstate commerce, while maintaining a clear distinction between them when
determining the scope of state power to regulate interstate commerce.
21. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387,
1389-90 (1987) (noting that the "Constitution contains two general types of provisions; the first
class is structural and was designed to divide powers between state and federal government . ...
The second class was designed to protect individual rights against wrongdoing by government.").
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called "the most expansive social legislation enacted in decades."2 2 The
statute is enormously complex, totaling nearly 2,700 pages. 23 The provi-
sion that has garnered the most intense political opposition is the
requirement that individuals maintain a minimum level of health insur-
ance coverage.24 This provision has also been a key focus of the legal
challenges to the PPACA.25
The PPACA was first introduced in the House on September 17,
2009.26 In enacting the PPACA, Congress considered the large impact
that the current health care system had on the economy. For example,
Congress specifically found that in 2009, health insurance and health
care services composed 17.6 percent of the national economy, and that
nearly half of all personal bankruptcies were the result of medical
expenses.27 Additionally, Congress estimated that health care reform
would save the federal budget billions of dollars.2 8
On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act of 2010 into law.2 ' As noted, the "requirement
to maintain minimum essential coverage," more often referred to as the
22. Stolberg & Pear, supra note 2.
23. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp.
2d. 1120, 1128 (noting that "[a]t nearly 2,700 pages, the Act is very lengthy and includes many
provisions").
24. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501,
124 Stat. 119 (2010).
25. See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 890-91 (E.D. Mich.
2010), affd, No. 10-2388, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (discussing the
individual mandate); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3: 10-CV-
91-RVIEMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *7-29 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (same).
26. See H.R. 3590, 11Ith Cong. (1st Sess. 2010).
27. See 42 U.S.C.A § 18091(a)(2) (West 2010).
28. See, e.g., Douglas W. Elmendorf, Preliminary Analysis of the Affordable Health Care for
America Act as Introduced in the House of Representatives on October 29, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE
DIRS. BLOG (Oct. 29, 2009, 4:39 PM), http://cboblog.cbo.gov/?m=200910 (noting that "enacting
[this plan for health care reform] would result in a net reduction in federal budget deficits of $104
billion over the 2010-2019 period").
29. Seven days after its enactment, the PPACA was amended. See Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). However, this
amendment did not materially change who is affected by the PPACA or the mechanics of how it
functions. A vast majority of the changes only affected the amounts of money and dates applicable
to a provision. See, e.g., Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, 124 Stat. 1029, 1030-32 (2010) (changing the amount of the premium tax credits); id. 124
Stat. at 1033 (changing the numbers used for calculating the penalties for the employer
responsibility requirements); id. 124 Stat. at 1034-36 (replacing the term "modified gross
income" with "adjusted gross income"); id. 124 Stat. at 1047 (changing the applicable years and
ratio amount used to calculate savings from limits on MA Plan administrative costs); id. 124 Stat.
at 1201 (changing the amount of the increase in federal funding for states' medical assistance
programs); id. 124 Stat. at 1075 (adding new date restrictions to the definition of "graduate" for
the termination of FFEL PLUS loans).
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individual mandate, 3 0 is a key provision of the PPACA.3 1 The general
idea is to require nearly everyone to have health insurance coverage.
Specifically, "applicable individuals" are required to maintain "mini-
mum essential coverage."32
The scope of the requirement is not quite as universal as first
appears for two reasons. First, not all persons are encompassed within
the term "applicable individuals." That term excludes those who have a
religious-based objection to coverage, those who are covered by a
"health care sharing ministry," individuals not lawfully present in the
United States, and prisoners. Second, people who fall within the term
"applicable individuals" are nevertheless exempt from the penalty if
they cannot afford coverage, fall below a filing threshold,34 belong to an
Indian tribe, or go without coverage for only a few months. Everyone
else-that is, all non-exempt applicable individuals-must maintain
"minimum essential coverage." This requirement is satisfied by cover-
age through select government-sponsored programs, employer-spon-
sored plans, plans in the individual market, grandfathered health plans,
and "other coverage.1"36
30. See, e.g., Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 786 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(using the term "individual mandate"). This term has been the source of some controversy. See
infra note 36.
31. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
32. I.R.C. § 5000A(a) (West 2010) ("An applicable individual shall for each month beginning
after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the individual who is an applicable
individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for such month.") (emphasis added). An
"applicable individual" who does not possess the minimum essential coverage must pay a
"penalty." Id.
33. Id. § 5000A(d).
34. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119, 247 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, 1032 (2010) (striking "under 100 percent of poverty line" and inserting
"below filing threshold").
35. I.R.C. § 5000A(e).
36. Id. § 5000A(d)-(e). Some commentators have objected to using the term "individual
mandate" on the ground that it overstates the scope of the mandate. See Balkin, Commerce, supra
note 12, at 45 (calling "individual mandate" misleading because of those who are exempted from
the requirement); see also Gayland 0. Hethcoat II, Note, Plaintiff Standing in Florida ex rel.
Bondi and the Challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 65 U. MIAMI. L.
REV. 1241, 1246 n.26 (2011) (describing the "individual mandate" as "overbroad"). For example,
Professor Balkin states that "[t]he mandate would not apply to dependents, persons receiving
Medicare or Medicaid, military families, persons living overseas, persons with religious
objections, or persons who already get health insurance from their employers under a qualified
plan." Jack M. Balkin, The Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate for Health Insurance, N.
ENG. J. MED., Jan. 13, 2010, http://www.nejm.org/doilpdf/10.1056/NEJMpl00087?ssource=hcrc
[hereinafter Balkin, Individual Mandate]. This objection seems misplaced. For one thing, it is
irrelevant. A mandate that applied to every individual would still fall within Congress's
Commerce Clause powers. To illustrate, Congress could, if it chose, abolish Medicare, Medicaid,
and employer-based health insurance plans, and then require all individuals to purchase individual
plans. The objection also reflects a misreading of the statute. Individuals who are covered by
2652011]1
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In approving the PPACA, Congress found that "the requirement is
essential to creating effective health insurance markets."" Indeed, Con-
gress explicitly determined that ". . . [i]n the absence of the requirement,
some individuals would make an economic and financial decision to
forgo health insurance coverage and attempt to self-insure, which
increases financial risks to households and medical providers."38
Reasonable persons might disagree over how necessary the man-
date is in fact to the success of health care reform. The Massachusetts
health care reform provides some evidence that a mandate was effective
in broadening participation in private health insurance, which can help
reduce its cost.39 However, there is a concern that the fragmented nature
of the national health insurance market may undercut the efficacy of the
individual mandate in helping to keep health care costs down.4 0
Moreover, the best way to address the many problems facing the
health care industry is unclear and has been the subject of debate for
decades.4 1 Not surprisingly, the PPACA itself was hotly contested in
Congress.42 It took twenty-five days for the bill to pass the Senate by a
strict 60-39 party-line vote.43 Four months later, even with unanimous
employer-based health care plans, for example, are subject to the mandate; it is just that their
enrollment in the plan satisfies the requirement of "minimum essential coverage." See I.R.C.
§ 5000A(f).
37. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(G) (West 2010). Additionally, the PPACA lacks a
severability provision, which could result in the entire Act being invalidated if the individual
mandate is found unconstitutional. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d
768, 790 (E.D. Va. 2010) (finding that the PPACA lacked a severability provision, but still
severed the individual mandate based on case law). But see Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-CV-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *39 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31,
2011) (finding that because "the individual mandate and the remaining provisions are all
inextricably bound together," the entire Act must be struck down as unconstitutional after holding
the individual mandate unconstitutional). The issue of severability is beyond the scope of this
note, but it is important to be cognizant of the issue because it may affect the impact of the
inevitable Supreme Court decision.
38. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2).
39. See Amitabh Chandra et al., The Importance of the Individual Mandate-Evidence from
Massachusetts, N. ENG. J. MED., Jan. 12, 2011, http://healthpolicyandreform.nejm.org/?p=13572
&query=home (finding that "the mandate had a causal role in improving risk selection").
40. See Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented
Markets, and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 48-49 (2010). Further, it is not certain
whether the mandate will work as expected. Id. at 76-77.
41. See, e.g., Gwen Ifill, New Health Plan, Old Abortion Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1993, at
A14 (discussing the inability to reach a consensus opinion on President Clinton's health care
plan); Robert Pear, Bipartisan Medicare Panel to Call for More Spending, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 21,
2002, at A5 (discussing the inability to reach a consensus opinion on President Bush's spending
on health care).
42. See Robert Pear & David M. Herszenhom, Key Democrat Reports Progress in Health Bill
Talks, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 19, 2009, at Al5 (discussing the difficulty in reaching an agreement in
the Senate as "Republicans have said they will use every tool to block the bill").
43. Robert Pear, Senate Passes Health Care Overhaul on Party-Line Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
25, 2009, at Al.
266 [Vol. 66:259
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Republican opposition, the bill passed the House by a vote of
219-212." Instead of ceasing after President Obama signed the PPACA
into law, much of the legislative opposition shifted toward repeal
attempts.45 On January 19, 2011, the House of Representatives approved
a bill repealing the PPACA;4 6 the Senate subsequently rejected the
repeal effort.4 7
The very fact of this controversy should play a central role in any
analysis of the constitutionality of the PPACA. The question for the
Court is not whether in fact the PPACA will improve health care, or
whether the individual mandate is necessary to health care reform, but is
whether Congress might rationally believe so-which it certainly could.
Only this proper framing of the question before the Court ensures that
fundamental-and controversial-questions of economic and social pol-
icy are resolved through the political process rather than by the courts.
At least fourteen legal challenges to the PPACA have been filed,
with some cases pending in multiple federal appellate courts.4 8 Three
major issues predominate in these challenges. The first issue is whether
the individuals and the States that have challenged the constitutionality
of the Act have standing to do so.49 The second is whether the individual
mandate violates the Commerce Clause or other constitutional provi-
sions.5 0 The third issue is whether the PPACA fundamentally changes
the Medicaid program in a manner that reaches the unconstitutional level
of "coercion and commandeering" of the states-and so violates the
44. Robert Pear & David M. Herszenhorn, Obama Hails Vote on Health Care as Answering
'the Call of History,' N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 22, 2010, at Al.
45. See David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, House Votes for Repeal of Health Law, N.Y.
TiMEs, Jan. 20, 2011, at Al.
46. See id.
47. David M. Herszenhorn, Senate Rejects Repeal of Health Care Lw, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
2011, at A20.
48. See Bradley W. Joondeph, ACA Litigation Blog: The First Bit ofACA Litigation to Reach
the Supreme Court, ACA LrriG. BLOG http://acalitigationblog.blogspot.com, (last visited May 21,
2011) (discussing the legal challenges to the PPACA before the Third, Fourth, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals among others).
49. See, e.g., N.J. Physicians, Inc. v. Obama, 757 F. Supp. 2d 502 (D.N.J. 2010) (dismissing
the suit for lack of standing); Baldwin v. Sebelius, No. 10CV1033-DMS(WMC), 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 89192, at *13-14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010) (dismissing the suit for lack of standing). One
commentator argues that the issue of standing could fundamentally affect the shape of the
challenge within the Eleventh Circuit. See generally Hethcoat, supra note 36.
50. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-CV-91-
RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *7-29 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (accepting plaintiffs' challenges
under the Commerce Clause); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 641-44 (W.D.
Va. 2010) (rejecting plaintiffs' challenges under the Free Exercise Clause and Religious Freedom
Restoration Act); Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-
CV-91-RV/EMT, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55270, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2010) (rejecting
intervening plaintiffs' challenge that the PPACA is "invalid because Obama was purportedly not
born in the United States, so he is ineligible to be President and could not sign the bill into law").
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Tenth Amendment.5 '
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE UNDER
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The PPACA is poised to become the subject of the next landmark
case in a long line of Supreme Court cases delineating the scope of the
Commerce Clause. As a brief examination of the history of these cases
shows, the deference the Court has given Congress under the Commerce
Clause has varied considerably since Gibbons v. Ogden,5 2 decided
almost two centuries ago. In resolving the challenges to the PPACA, the
central question for the Court will be whether it decisively returns Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence to an earlier, pre-New Deal era in which the
Court significantly limited Congress's regulatory powers, or whether it
affirms the leading role of Congress in determining the scope of the
Commerce Clause.
A. Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes."" Further, Congress has the power to "make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execu-
tion the foregoing Powers . . . ."I" The jurisprudence of what "com-
merce" truly is and thus the extent of Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause can be broken into roughly four different eras.
The Court took a fairly deferential stance in evaluating the constitu-
tionality of Congress's exercise of its Commerce Clause powers
throughout the first era. Writing for the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden,
Chief Justice John Marshall held that Congress had the power to regu-
late a steamboat service operating between New Jersey and New York
under the Commerce Clause.56 He expansively defined commerce by
rejecting the claim that commerce is limited "to traffic, to buying and
selling, or the interchange of commodities . . . ."I Justice Marshall rea-
soned that:
51. Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 720 F. Supp. 2d 1120,
1156-61 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (allowing a challenge of "coercion and commandeering" to initially
survive a motion to dismiss); cf Liberty Univ., 753 F. Supp. 2d at 635-37 (rejecting a challenge of
unlawful coercion).
52. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
53. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
54. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
55. For a sharply different account, see Epstein, supra note 21, at 1399-1454.
56. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 221-22 (1824).
57. Id. at 189.
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This would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to
one of its significations . . . it is something more: it is intercourse. It
describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of
nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for
carrying on that intercourse."
With the rise of industrialization and greater federal regulation in
the late nineteenth century, the Court began to show much less deference
to Congress. To be sure, it did not always strike down Congress's regu-
lations under the Commerce Clause." In general, however, it narrowly
interpreted the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause.60 In particular, it drew several key distinctions between what
Congress could regulate and what it could not. First, "commerce" could
be regulated, but "manufacturing" or "mining" could not.6 1 Second,
local activities that had only an "indirect"-rather than a "direct"-
effect on interstate commerce could not be regulated.6 2 Third, activities
in the "stream of commerce" could be regulated even if they were
local, but activities outside of the stream of commerce could not.64
Last, regulations of interstate commerce could be invalidated if they
were a "pretext" for an illicit extension of congressional authority to
local matters.65
The third era commenced in the 1930s, as Congress resorted to
expanding the use of federal power to combat the Great Depression.
Starting with its decision in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.,66 the Court's previous hostility to economic regu-
lation and its apparent preference for a laissez-faire economy eroded.
With the Court's return to Chief Justice Marshall's approach in Gibbons
v. Ogden, an expansive view of Congress's Commerce Clause power
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 330 (1903) (upholding federal ban on
interstate sale of foreign lottery tickets).
60. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935)
(holding that Congress cannot regulate chicken slaughterhouses because they only indirectly affect
interstate commerce).
61. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895) (holding that Congress
cannot stop a monopoly in the sugar refining industry because manufacturing only has an indirect
effect on commerce); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303-04 (1936) (holding that
Congress cannot regulate mining because it is "purely local in character").
62. See, e.g., Schechter, 295 U.S. at 551 (holding that Congress cannot regulate chicken
slaughterhouses because they only indirectly affect interstate commerce).
63. See, e.g., Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 518-19 (1922) (holding that Congress can
regulate stockyards and meat-packing because of their effects on the "stream of commerce").
64. See, e.g., Schechter, 295 U.S. at 551 (holding that Congress cannot regulate chicken
slaughterhouses because they are not within the "stream of commerce").
65. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271-72 (1918) (holding that Congress
cannot regulate child labor because its aim is to regulate manufacturing).
66. 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act of 1935).
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dominated the case law for the next sixty years.67 The categorical dis-
tinctions the Court drew in the second era were largely replaced with a
deferential approach. 8
Wickard v. Filburn69 epitomizes the Court's Commerce Clause
analysis during the third era. In Wickard, the Supreme Court upheld a
federal statute penalizing a wheat farmer for producing more wheat than
was permitted under his individual allotment."o The farmer asserted that
Congress had no power to regulate wheat produced and consumed on his
farm without ever being brought to the market. 7 1 Noting that the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act's goal was to limit wheat production in order to
drive up prices, the Court upheld the penalty on the ground that Con-
gress might rationally conclude that the aggregate effect of the produc-
tion of wheat for consumption on the farm could bring wheat prices
down, thus undermining the efficacy of the federal price stabilization
scheme.7 2 Justice Jackson's opinion explained that "[t]he effect of the
statute before us is to restrict . . . the extent . . . to which one may
forestall resort to the market by producing to meet his own needs."73 As
the Court expressly stated, the statute effectively mandated that farmers
purchase wheat for in-farm consumption instead of growing it at home.74
In 1995, the Court shifted views once again and somewhat nar-
rowed the scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. In
United States v. Lopez,7 the first case in the fourth-and current-era
of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the
Court struck down a federal statute that criminalized possession of a gun
within a school zone. Possession of a gun is not "commerce" or an "eco-
nomic" act, the Court ruled, and so the Court declined to uphold the
statute because of possible aggregate effects on the economy of possess-
ing guns in local school zones. The adverse economic effects were so far
attenuated that the statute ultimately could not be said to regulate an
67. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
68. Not one federal law was held unconstitutional as exceeding the scope of Congress's
commerce power during the third era. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 49
(upholding the National Labor Relations Act of 1935); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 126
(1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28
(1942) (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146, 156-57 (1971) (upholding the Consumer Credit Protection Act).
69. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
70. Id. at 127-28.
71. Both the growing and the consumption of wheat occurred entirely within the state on the
farmer's own land.
72. Id. at 127-29.
73. Id. at 127.
74. Id. at 128-29.
75. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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economic activity substantially affecting interstate commerce.76 The
majority in Lopez also indicated that legislation regulating conduct "tra-
ditionally" left to the states is very likely to be struck down under the
Court's Commerce Clause analysis."
Five years later, in United States v. Morrison, the Court held that
a federal statute providing a civil remedy for gender-motivated violence
was beyond Congress's Commerce Clause authority. The regulation's
link to economic activity was based on speculative assumptions. The
Court strongly emphasized that historically, intrastate regulations
enacted under the Commerce Clause were upheld only where the activ-
ity was economic in nature, though the Court refrained from definitively
adopting "a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any
noneconomic activity."80
Lopez and Morrison seemed to signal a return to the categorical
approach of the second era, with the adoption of a distinction between
"economic" and "noneconomic" activity. The Court also placed weight
in both cases on the claim that the regulations impinged on areas "tradi-
tionally" left to state regulation." These included family law, education,
and crime. 82
In Gonzales v. Raich,8 3 however, the Court signaled limits to its
new, more vigorous scrutiny of federal legislation under the Commerce
Clause. The Court upheld a federal statute outlawing the cultivation of
marijuana grown for home-consumption." The growing of medical
marijuana in one's backyard, purely for personal consumption, fell
within Congress's Commerce Clause authority. Congress, the Court
held, could rationally conclude that it needed to reach even seemingly
local noneconomic activity because of California's exemptions to the
prohibition would "have a significant impact on both the supply and
demand sides of the market for marijuana."8 Justice Stevens's opinion
for the Raich Court once again demonstrated the broad reach of the
76. Id.
77. Id. at 611 ("The Court does not assert (and could not plausibly maintain) that the
commerce power is wholly devoid of congressional authority to speak on any subject of
traditional state concern; but if congressional action is not forbidden absolutely when it touches
such a subject, it will stand or fall depending on the Court's view of the strength of the
legislation's commercial justification.").
78. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
79. Id. at 615.
80. Id. at 613 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60).
81. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(assessing the regulation of "entire areas of traditional state concern").
82. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64 (majority opinion).
83. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 30-33.
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Commerce Clause. Indeed, Wickard and Raich together represent the
current outer limits of the broad interpretation of Congress's Commerce
Clause power.8 6
B. The Importance of the Commerce Clause Challenges
Of all the challenges to the PPACA, the Commerce Clause chal-
lenges to the individual mandate are of greatest doctrinal importance. As
noted, the Court demonstrated a more active role in enforcing federalism
limits on Congress's power since 1995."1 The challenges to the individ-
ual mandate will likely dictate the current federalism limits placed on
Congress's power. A decision to strike down the statute or a key provi-
sion-the individual mandate-would place the Supreme Court in the
position of invalidating a major policy initiative. 8 While the Gun-Free
School Zones Act,8 9 the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act,90 and
the Controlled Substances Act' are by no means trivial, none compares
in importance and scale to the PPACA. This legislation represents a
comprehensive effort to reform an industry of immense national impor-
tance because the health care industry is vital to the economy. 92 The
United States economy loses $207 billion annually "because of the
poorer health and shorter lifespan of the uninsured."93 To remedy the
national problems of rising health care costs, Congress enacted the
PPACA with the prediction that it would "result in a net reduction in
federal budget deficits of $104,000,000,000 over the 2010-2019
period."94
Invalidating the PPACA or any key portion of it could prevent
these changes and have a lasting impact on the future of health care and
the economy in the United States. In fact, doing so would have more
practical significance even than A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
86. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 780 (E.D. Va. 2010) (noting
that "Wickard and Gonzales . . . staked out the outer boundaries of Commerce Clause power").
87. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the federal statute);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down the federal statute). But see Raich, 545
U.S. at 41-42 (upholding the federal statute).
88. David Leonhardt, A Piece Missing in the Reform, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 13, 2010, at B1
(calling the PPACA "the most ambitious domestic policy legislation in decades").
89. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
90. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 902.
91. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 8.
92. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(B) (West 2010) ("National health spending is projected to
increase from $2,500,000,000,000, or 17.6 percent of the economy, in 2009 to $4,700,000,000,000
in 2019.").
93. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(E).
94. See Elmendorf, supra note 28.
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United States,9 5 one of the cases that triggered President Roosevelt's
"court-packing" plan.96 The National Industrial Recovery Act was to
expire in a few short weeks after the decision was rendered.17 In con-
trast, most of the provisions within the PPACA do not even come into
effect until 2014.98 Invalidating the PPACA could render stillborn a
major, comprehensive reform enacted by Congress.
The political impact might be lessened if, at the time the Supreme
Court rules, public opinion shifts decisively against the PPACA. Only
five months before the bill passed the House,99 public approval of Presi-
dent Obama's health care plan dropped below fifty percent for the first
time since beginning his presidency.10 Approval of President Obama, a
clear advocate for the health care reform, declined from December 2009
until December 2010, but has been steadily increasing in 2011.101 Yet
even if public opinion shifted decisively against the PPACA, its popular-
ity might grow as it takes effect."o2 A Supreme Court decision striking
down the mandate or the entire PPACA before its primary features take
effect in 2014 would mean that the statute's support would never be
fully tested, in the eyes of its supporters. Further, the likely coincidence
of a pending Supreme Court decision on the PPACA and the 2012 presi-
dential election will certainly exacerbate the political impact of the
PPACA. For all of these reasons, the political significance of a decision
95. 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding that key portions of the National Industrial Recovery Act
were unconstitutional).
96. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 203 (6th ed. 2009).
97. See id. at 202 (noting that the Act "was due to expire a few weeks after Schechter was
decided, and there had been no effort to extend its life even before the decision").
98. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2) (West 2010) (stating that waiver for state innovation
with respect to health insurance coverage requirements begin in 2014); id. § 18091(c)(1)(A)
(stating that the essential health care benefits for cost sharing and their corresponding
requirements begin in 2014); I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(2) (West 2010) (stating that the calculations for
the monthly penalty amounts begin in 2014).
99. See Pear & Herszenhom, supra note 44.
100. Dan Balz & Jon Cohen, Approval Ratings Drop for Obama on Health Care, Other Issues,
WASH. POST, July 20, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/19/
AR2009071902176.html. However, these measurements are not necessarily indicative of the
public opinion on the PPACA before the expected Supreme Court review.
101. See Chris Weigant, A Deep Dive into President Obama's Public Approval Ratings, Bus.
INSIDER (Mar. 3, 2011, 10:02 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/a-deep-dive-into-president-
obamas-public-approval-ratings-2011-3.
102. Supporters of the PPACA argue that as its features take effect, the public will have a
better understanding of what changes the health care reform makes, which will consequently
increase its popularity. See Robert Pear, Making Exceptions in Obama's Health Care Act Draws
Kudos, and Criticism, N.Y. TH Es, Mar. 21, 2011, at A21. Senator Max Baucus, Democrat of
Montana, and also a legislator who helped write the law as chairman of the Finance Committee,
commented on some of the disapproval of the PPACA, saying "[a] lot of Americans just don't
know about some of the benefits." Id.
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invalidating the PPACA on Commerce Clause grounds would be
immense.
Some commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court may
rule on the PPACA's constitutionality under Congress's taxing
power.' District Court decisions have already addressed this possibil-
ity.'" A ruling under Congress's taxing power might be attractive to the
Supreme Court as a way of avoiding a sharp confrontation with the
political branches over the Commerce Clause. Briefly, the argument is
that that the PPACA is valid under Congress's power to impose taxes
for the general welfare.' This is a broad power, which gives Congress
the authority to act in situations where it might otherwise lack authority
under the Commerce Clause. 06
One argument against upholding the mandate as a tax is that the
statutory provisions creating the individual mandate explicitly use the
term "penalty" rather than "tax."' 0 7 When assessing the constitutionality
of an exercise of Congress's taxing power, however, the Court should
heed its own admonition that "[i]nquiry into the hidden motives which
may move Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon
it is beyond the competency of the courts." 0 Interestingly, the argu-
ment has been rejected by most courts to consider this issue.' 09
An analysis of the taxing power is beyond the scope of this note." 0
103. See, e.g., Balkin, Commerce, supra note 12, at 45 (claiming that the individual mandate is
a valid tax); Edward D. Kleinbard, Constitutional Kreplach, 128 TAX NoTs 755 (2010) (claiming
that the penalty to enforce the individual mandate is a valid use of Congress's taxing power);
Balkin, Individual Mandate, supra note 36 (claiming that "[t]he individual mandate is a tax" and
valid under Congress's taxing power). But see Barnett, supra note 5, at 609-10 (claiming that the
individual mandate "cannot possibly be construed as a tax").
104. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 778-79 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(rejecting the argument that the individual mandate is a valid use of Congress's taxing power).
105. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. I ("The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general Welfare.").
106. See Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 783 (noting that "[t]he Secretary also reiterates that
Congress may use its power under the tax clause even for purposes that would exceed its power
under other provisions of Article I").
107. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 610 (2010) ("[T]he penalty does not even purport to be a tax.
It is called a 'penalty.'"). See generally I.R.C. § 5000A (West 2010) (describing the amount an
applicable individual failing to meet the required minimum level of health insurance has to pay as
a "penalty").
108. Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937).
109. See, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 890-91 (E.D. Mich.
2010), affd, No. 10-2388, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011); Goudy-
Bachman v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 764 F. Supp. 2d 684,694-97 (M.D. Pa. 2011);
Cuccinelli, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 786-88; Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611,
627-29 (W.D. Va. 2010); U.S. Citizens Ass'n v. Sebelius, 754 F. Supp. 2d 903, 909-10 (N.D.
Ohio 2010).
I10. Two judges on the Sixth Circuit panel expressed the view that the mandate could not be
upheld under Congress's taxing power. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011
U.S. App. LEXIS 13265, at *49-64 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring).
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What is clear, however, is that the potential for upholding the individual
mandate under Congress's taxing power does not obviate the importance
of the Commerce Clause issue. Commentary on the constitutionality of
the PPACA-when analyzed under the Commerce Clause as well as
Congress's other powers-spills far more ink on the Commerce Clause
issue."' Granted, the Commerce Clause issue may just be the most
interesting to some scholars. However, it seems more likely that the rea-
son for the vast disparity in the amount of commentary analyzing the
PPACA under the Commerce Clause rather than under the taxing power
is that, to some, the Commerce Clause issue is a more difficult question.
If the Supreme Court were to take a similar position, and subsequently
avoid deciding the Commerce Clause question by treating the matter as
a valid exercise of the power to tax, this would still be making a major
statement about the Commerce Clause.' 12
This note argues that existing Commerce Clause doctrine provides
ample support for Congress's authority to pass the PPACA and the indi-
vidual mandate. Avoiding any resolution of the Commerce Clause chal-
lenge, by relying instead on Congress's taxing power, would amount to
an implicit determination by the Court that the Commerce Clause issue
was in fact a close and difficult question. In light of this possibility, as
this note argues, that position would be a significant departure from
existing case law.
C. New Distinctions Within the Commerce Clause Challenges
Today, the Supreme Court uses a three-pronged analysis to deter-
mine if a federal law has been properly enacted under the Commerce
Clause."' The Lopez analysis presumes that Congress may: (1) regulate
"the use of the channels of interstate or foreign commerce" (for exam-
ple, by banning the interstate shipment of stolen goods); (2) protect "the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce" (for example, by criminalizing
theft of goods in interstate commerce); and (3) regulate "those activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce" (for example, by prohibit-
ing unfair labor practices impacting interstate commerce)."' This third
111. In one commentator's article addressing the constitutionality of the PPACA, less than
three pages even discuss the taxing power issue, while the other forty-eight pages focus on the
Commerce Clause issue. See Balkin, Commerce, supra note 12, at 46-47.
112. The same would be true of a ruling that relied critically on the Necessary and Proper
Clause to uphold the individual mandate. For one such analysis, see Mark A. Hall, Commerce
Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform, 159 U. PENN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript
at 24), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id= 1747189. It would amount
to a conclusion that the Commerce Clause alone provided insufficient or doubtful basis for the
individual mandate.
113. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
114. Id. at 558-59.
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prong is often considered the "most hotly contested facet of the com-
merce power," and it is the one likely to be relevant to any Supreme
Court ruling on the constitutionality of the mandate." 5
Under this analysis, the purchase and sale of health insurance-a
major national industry in itself-is clearly an economic activity.' 6 Fur-
ther, the fact that many individuals are uninsured has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce."' 7 Those who choose to self-insure reduce the
total number of people in an insurance plan. A smaller pool of insured
individuals results in less people to spread costs amongst, which forces
insurers to raise premiums."' Individual decisions not to purchase insur-
ance thus have a cumulative and substantial effect on interstate com-
merce. Therefore, the individual mandate is "an essential part of a larger
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could
be undercut unless the intrastate activity was regulated.""'
For these reasons, the individual mandate to purchase health insur-
ance would appear to be a valid use of Congress's Commerce Clause
power under Lopez and its progeny to regulate the health insurance and
115. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-CV-91-RV/
EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *10 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (quoting Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental
USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242, 1250 (11th Cir. 2008)).
116. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 92; JENNIFER STAMAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R40725, REQUIRING INDIVIDUALS TO OBTAIN HEALTH INSURANCE: A CONSTITUTIONAL
ANALYSIS 12 (2010) (noting that "health care expenditures in the United States grew 4.4% to $2.3
trillion, or $7,681 per person" in 2008); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322
U.S. 533, 553 (1944) (noting that insurance is commerce); cf United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 613 (2000) (striking down the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 because "[g]ender-
motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity) (emphasis
added); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 28 (1937) (upholding the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 because the steel company operated nationwide).
117. See US CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, INCOME POVERTY, AND
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007 23 (2008) (noting that nearly one-
fifth of Americans are uninsured).
118. See Hoffman, supra note 40, at 55 ("With fewer healthy people in the large group
insurance pools, the goals of regulation .. . through the individual mandate, which rely upon broad
risk pooling, are impeded."). Additionally, this occurrence is especially true because those with
the greatest medical needs are the most likely to seek insurance.
119. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24 (2005) (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561); see also
Hoffman, supra note 40, at 27 (claiming that "the individual health insurance mandate might serve
several efficiency objectives"). The "essential" aspect of the individual mandate merits an
additional note. President Obama is "willing to amend the measure to give states the ability to opt
out of its most controversial requirements from the start, including the mandate that most people
buy insurance." Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Kevin Sack, Obama Backs Easing State Health Law
Mandates, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, at Al. In one respect, this could be completely irrelevant. If
the mandate were held to be an unconstitutional reach of Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause, then an exception to an already invalid exercise of power would not validate it. However,
if the mandate were held to be within Congress's power under the Commerce Clause, then this
could be an illustrative example of sensitivity to the states. President Obama described this as "a
reasonable proposal," which would be in line with maintaining the balance of power between the
state government and the federal government. See id.
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health care markets.12 0 Nevertheless, the constitutionality of the individ-
ual mandate has been strongly challenged.12' The legal challenges rely
on introducing three new distinctions to Commerce Clause doctrine: (1)
regulating an activity versus an inactivity;122 (2) regulating voluntary
versus involuntary conduct; 123 and (3) regulating a unique market or in a
unique way.1 24
None of these distinctions is helpful conceptually. On the contrary,
each one introduces a host of philosophical and practical questions that
would be distracting, at best, to courts attempting to determine the con-
stitutionality of congressional legislation. Further, none of these distinc-
tions is warranted under governing case law. Not only would integrating
these new distinctions needlessly complicate Commerce Clause doc-
trine, but they also would unjustifiably extend the Court's supervision of
elected officials making basic policy decisions.
1. ACTIVITY AND INACTIVITY
The first distinction drawn in challenges to the constitutionality of
the individual mandate is between activity and inactivity. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Florida adopted this
distinction because it would have been a "radical departure from existing
case law to hold that Congress can regulate inactivity under the Com-
merce Clause." 25 The court declared, "The threshold question that must
be addressed is whether activity is required before Congress can exercise
its power under the Commerce Clause," and answered the question in
the affirmative.12 6 On the contrary, the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Michigan found that adopting the distinction was
irrelevant to a ruling on the constitutionality of the individual mandate
120. The notion that the Court will not view regulations favorably if they touch on areas
traditionally left to the States and the subsequent discussion on what is "traditionally" left to the
States is outside the scope of this note. It is clear, however, that well before the enactment of the
PPACA, health care was a field in which the federal government was extensively involved. As the
Sixth Circuit opinion noted, moreover, the PPACA regulates both the health insurance market and
the health care market as a whole. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 U.S.
App. LEXIS 13265, at *30-32 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011).
121. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs, No. 3: 10-CV-91-RV/EMT,
2011 WL 285683, at *10 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
122. See id. at *21 (noting that "[the Supreme Court] has never been called upon to consider if
'activity' is required").
123. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 778-79 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(describing the failure to purchase health care as an involuntary act).
124. Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *23.
125. Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *22.
126. Id. at *21-22 (adopting the distinction because "'activity' is an indispensable part [of] the
Commerce Clause analysis"); see also Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 781
(adopting the distinction because federal regulations "must involve activity").
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because the "characterization of the Commerce Clause reaching eco-
nomic decisions is more accurate." 2 7 Inconsistent application of the
activity and inactivity distinction reflects the conceptual flaw in its rea-
soning. Moreover, there is no support for it in the Court's case law, and
no reason for changing the case law to now include it.
a. Conceptual Analysis
Conceptually, the distinction between activity and inactivity is
fraught with ambiguities and uncertainties that make it a poor choice for
a key factor in Commerce Clause analysis. What determines whether
something is activity or inactivity is always subject to interpretation.
Virtually any conduct can be characterized either way.128 Consider an
individual who has a health insurance policy that automatically renews
annually unless the individual cancels it. If the individual does nothing
on the renewal date, does this constitute activity (purchasing another
year of insurance coverage) or inactivity (failing to cancel the coverage
for the coming year)? 29
The ambiguity in this distinction also bedevils other areas of the
law. Criminal law contains countless decisions focused on determining
whether an act was committed. 3 o In general, a crime requires some act,
also known as an actus reus:'3 ' Consider a mother who fails to take care
of her child. Would this be a criminal violation because she spent the
day taking care of herself instead of the child (activity)? Or is it because
127. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 894 (E.D. Mich. 2010); see also
Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 633 (W.D. Va. 2010) (finding the distinction
irrelevant because "individuals' decisions about how and when to pay for health care are
activities").
128. Cf Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265, at *82
(6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring) ("A drug-possession law amounts to forced
inaction in some settings (those who do not have drugs must not get them), and forced action in
other settings (those who have drugs must get rid of them).").
129. Cf. id. ("What of individuals who voluntarily have insurance on the day the mandate goes
into effect? . . . It is not clear what the action/inaction line means in a setting in which an
individual voluntarily (and actively) obtains coverage and is required only to maintain it
thereafter."); see also id. at *86-87 (noting that individuals compelled by state law to purchase
insurance would already appear to be active in the market).
130. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (holding that the state may not
outlaw the condition of narcotics addiction because there is no act); Proctor v. State, 176 P. 771,
774 (Okla. Crim. App. 1918) (holding that the state may not outlaw "keeping a place" with an
unlawful intent because there is no act).
131. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968) ("[C]riminal penalties may be inflicted only if
the accused has committed some act, has engaged in some behavior, which society has an interest
in preventing, or perhaps in historical common law terms, has committed some actus reus.").
Interestingly, an omission or a failure to act can also meet the requirements of a criminal violation.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 911-12 (1944) (convicting a bar owner of
manslaughter for the death of patrons in his establishment because his "[w]anton or reckless
conduct is the legal equivalent of intentional conduct").
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she failed to feed the child (inactivity)? Criminal law may have different
underlying policies from those underlying the Commerce Clause, but the
same difficulty in distinguishing between activity and inactivity is as
clear as in any other context-the seemingly arbitrary manner in which
something is framed dictates the distinction.
The fundamental reason for this ambiguity is that the conduct inevi-
tably takes place within a larger framework. This framework can often
be a legal one. For example, not eating broccoli might be viewed as
inactivity-the failure to consume something. But if there were a legal
requirement to eat broccoli, failure to do so might easily be construed as
defiance of the law, especially if the failure to consume it was deliberate.
Defiance might well appear to be an activity. Whether something is
activity or inactivity, then, may turn on what the law provides. Conse-
quently, making the validity of a law depend on a characterization of
something as activity or inactivity risks being circular.
The framework can also be the market itself. Professor Barnett, the
most prominent commentator on challenges to the constitutionality of
the mandate, "insists that an individual's decision not to buy health
insurance, or any product, cannot be considered activity, just as an indi-
vidual's decision not to sell a house is not activity-even though, multi-
plied many times over, it has a substantial effect on the housing
market."' 32 The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida struck down the individual mandate relying on a similar housing
market analogy in its opinion.133 But in this housing market analogy,
both Professor Barnett and the Florida District Court concede that the
regulation is derived from an economic effect on the housing market.13 1
Moreover, in the context of a well-developed private housing market, a
house is an economic asset that can be sold at any time. Thus not selling
132. Joan Indiana Rigdon, Does Obamacare Violate the Constitution?, WASH. LAWYER, Jan.
2011, at 25 (quoting Professor Barnett); see also Barnett, supra note 5, at 605 (discussing whether
a "decision not to sell your house" is an "activity ... that can be mandated by Congress").
133. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-CV-91-RV/
EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *24 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) ("Should Congress thus have the power
under the Commerce Clause to preemptively regulate [the housing market] . . . on the theory that
most everyone is currently, or inevitably one day will be, active in the housing market?"). This
court cited Professor Barnett in multiple opinions. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1160 n.18 (citing Professor Barnett
affirmatively in analysis of the individual mandate as a tax); Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *l l
(citing Professor Barnett affirmatively in analysis of the "Commerce Clause in its [h]istorical
[c]ontext"); id. at *14 (citing Professor Barnett affirmatively in analysis of the "[e]volution of
Commerce Clause [j]urisprudence").
134. However, these concessions are hedged with assertions that the relation to the economic
effect on the housing market would be attenuated. See Rigdon, supra note 132, at 25 (conceding
that there could be a "substantial effect on the housing market"); Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *24
(conceding that the regulation could be based on its connection to "add[ing] stability to the
housing and financial markets").
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a home inevitably involves a calculus-explicit at some times, implicit
at others-that continuing to live in a house or rent it out rather than sell
it is the preferable course of action. Unless the homeowner is dead, it is
hard to see how the homeowner is not engaged in decision making at all
times. And the activity of deciding whether to hold on to a house or to
sell it plainly has the kind of aggregate economic effect that brings the
matter within Congress's power under well-settled Commerce Clause
doctrine. To limit Congress's power by a conceptual distinction so easily
manipulated would be to practice constitutional law by proclamation.
b. Constitutional Analysis
The Sixth Circuit recently noted that the text of the Commerce
Clause makes no distinction between action and inaction.' Further, the
labeling of something as an activity or inactivity as a key step in consti-
tutional analysis under the Commerce Clause has no basis in the Court's
precedent.13 6 The Court's terminology certainly provides no basis for
creating a sharp legal divide between the regulation of activity and inac-
tivity. Its rulings have frequently described what Congress may regulate
under the Commerce Clause in terms of different categories of activ-
ity. 13 The Court, however, has frequently used other terms as well to
describe what Congress may regulate-including "transactions,"'
"obstructions in commerce," 39 "refusals of service,"' 40 and "dangers" to
interstate commerce. 141 More often than not, precedent focuses on the
economic effects of a regulation without explicitly stating whether the
regulation implicates a specific activity.142 Further, there are times when
it is unclear what factor is determinative under a Commerce Clause anal-
ysis, such as when the Court intermixes references to economic factors
with references to activity.1' Other formulations simply dispense with
135. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265, at
*49-64 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring).
136. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 893 (E.D. Mich. 2010)
(noting that the Court has "never needed to address the activity/inactivity distinction").
137. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) ("While we need not adopt
a categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide
these cases, thus far in our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of
intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.") (emphasis added).
138. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36 (1937); Hous., E. & W. Tex. Ry.
v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 35t-52 (1914).
139. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253-61 (1964).
140. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 303 (1964).
141. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 36-37.
142. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18 ("We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may
regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on
interstate commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local." (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995))).
143. Id. at 610 ("But a fair reading of Lopez shows that the noneconomic, criminal nature of
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any reference to specific factors that could be labeled as an activity or
otherwise. In Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., for example, the Court
referred simply to the "the fundamental principle . . . that power to regu-
late commerce is the power to enact all appropriate legislation for its
protection or advancement."'
Moreover, even where the Court has used words like "activity" or
"acts," it has applied them to states of affairs that could be characterized
equally as acts or omissions. A close examination of some of the Court's
leading Commerce Clause cases makes clear that its expressed disdain
for "attaching constitutional significance to a semantic difference"
should apply with full force to the PPACA and the individual
mandate.'45
In Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court sustained Congress's
power to outlaw the firing of employees seeking to unionize. 146 It would
be easy to pigeonhole the case as one in which activity (firing workers)
was regulated. However, firing employees could also be viewed as inac-
tivity (failing to continue to employ them). The Court, however, was
clear that the statute could equally be upheld as falling within Con-
gress's power to prevent or reduce the instances of strikes. Referring to a
strike as a "stoppage" of work, the Court discussed the "paralyzing con-
sequences of industrial war" for interstate commerce. 147 In turn, the
Court noted that employers' "[riefusal to confer and negotiate has been
one of the most prolific causes of the strife." 48 References to "stop-
page," "paralysis," and "refusal to confer and negotiate" could easily
suggest that Congress was regulating inactivity. On the other hand, a
strike or refusal to bargain could, with equal ease, be viewed as activity.
What matters is that nowhere in the opinion did the Court make its hold-
ing contingent on a conclusion that what was being regulated constituted
activity as opposed to inactivity.
Nearly thirty years later, in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States,14 9 the Court remained indifferent to the activity and inactivity
the conduct at issue was central to our decision in that case. . . . 'The Act [does not] regulat[e] a
commercial activity.'") (emphasis added).
144. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 36-37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310 (1992) (quoting Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 285 (1977)).
146. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 24 n.2 (referencing congressional findings that
the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 "encourag[ed] practices fundamental to the friendly
adjustment of industrial disputes").
147. Id. at 41.
148. Id. at 42.
149. 379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it illegal for places of
public accommodation to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin. Id. at
245. Is the refusal to serve someone because of race an activity or inactivity? One could say that it
28 12011]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
distinction. The Court held that Congress could prohibit racial discrimi-
nation by a local motel under the Commerce Clause because discrimina-
tion by motels had an effect on the interstate movement of persons and
goods.5 o The same day that the Court rendered its opinion in Heart of
Atlanta Motel, it declined to draw an activity and inactivity distinction in
Katzenbach v. McClung'"' as well by holding that "refusals of service"
based on racial discrimination had an effect on interstate commerce. In
short, the Court's consistent indifference to the distinction in using the
term "activity" is a strong signal that it has in no way made any activity
and inactivity distinction central to Congress's Commerce Clause
power.
Similarly unavailing are attempts to refocus the regulations in
Wickard and Raich in a manner that makes those decisions turn on an
activity and inactivity distinction.15 2 The regulation in Wickard was
aimed at limiting wheat production in order to raise wheat prices.'"5 The
farmer had grown more wheat than his permitted allotment under the
federal statute, but claimed that Congress could not penalize him for the
excess because he used it on his farm rather than sell it on the market. 154
The Court did not hold that because the farmer was growing wheat he
was engaged in an activity, thereby validating the regulation under the
Commerce Clause. Instead, the Court focused on the notion that "the
power to regulate commerce includes the power to regulate the prices at
which commodities in that commerce are dealt in and practices affecting
such prices."155 Under Commerce Clause analysis, Wickard stands for
the notion that if something in the aggregate has a "substantial effect in
defeating and obstructing" the act in question's purpose, then Congress
has the power to regulate.15 6 The operative words of this rationale are
not reliant on whether something is an activity or inactivity, but rather
on whether the efficacy of the regulation is substantially affected.
is the activity of discriminating or the activity of refusing to provide a room. However, one could
also say that it is the inactivity of failing to provide a room or restaurant service.
150. Id. at 260-62.
151. 379 U.S. 294, 303 (1964). Here too, one could have the same sterile debate-whether this
is the activity of refusing or the inactivity of failing to serve someone. Significantly, the Court
noted that "established restaurants in such areas sold less interstate goods because of the
discrimination." Id. at 300. This could suggest inactivity-goods not being sold.
152. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-CV-91-RV/
EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *20 n.14 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) ("The individual mandate differs
from the regulations in Wickard and Raich, for example, in that the individuals being regulated in
those cases were engaged in an activity . . . and each had the choice to discontinue that activity and
avoid penalty.") (emphasis added).
153. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 126 (1942).
154. Id. at 118-20.
155. Id. at 128.
156. Id. at 129.
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The argument that the Commerce Clause may only regulate activity
is slightly more believable in the context of Raich than it was in Wick-
ard, but the argument still lacks a constitutional basis.' 5 1 In Raich, the
Court declared that Congress has the "power to regulate purely local
activities that are part of an economic 'class of activities' that have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce."'"5  While it may be true that
the Court used the distinct label of "activities," the holding emphasized
the substantial effect on the national marijuana market.' Justice Ste-
vens analogized the facts of Raich to Wickard by comparing the home-
consumed wheat in Wickard to the home-consumed marijuana in
Raich.16 0 Therefore, even if something may or may not explicitly be
declared an "activity," the constitutionality of an act under the Com-
merce Clause is determined irrespective of this declaration.' 1
Even if the activity and inactivity distinction possessed a constitu-
tional basis, there are still valid reasons to believe that Congress has the
power to force someone into activity and regulate inactivity. In Cham-
pion v. Ames,16 2 the Court held that Congress may prohibit the transpor-
tation of lottery tickets from one state to another under the Commerce
Clause. Further, the Court rejected the contention that Congress may
only regulate commerce, not prohibit it.16 3 If the commerce regulated-
the activity-was playing the lottery, then Congress arguably has the
power to force someone into inactivity by not allowing that person to
play the lottery. Forcing someone into inactivity would seem in itself to
be a regulation of inactivity, but even if that view were rejected, it is
hard to see why, if Congress can force someone into inactivity, it should
be barred from forcing that person into activity.'64 Significantly, the
Court in Wickard stated that "[t]he stimulation of commerce is a use of
157. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005).
158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. See id. at 32-33.
160. Id. at 18-19 ("Just as the Agricultural Adjustment Act was designed to control the volume
[of wheat] moving in interstate and foreign commerce in order to avoid surpluses . . . and
consequently control the market price . . . a primary purpose of the [federal regulation here] is to
control the supply and demand of controlled substances in both lawful and unlawful drug
markets.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. It is telling, moreover, that in his dissent in Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, Judge
Graham repeatedly cited or referred to Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Raich, virtually
characterizing Raich as an aberration. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011
U.S. App. LEXIS 13265, at *115-20 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (Graham, J., dissenting) (claiming
that "[n]otwithstanding Raich, I believe the Court remains committed to the path laid down by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas . .
162. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
163. Id. at 328 (noting that "regulation may sometimes appropriately assume the form of
prohibition").
164. Similarly, neither is it sufficient to uphold a regulation because it forces someone into
activity or inactivity. The distinction is simply not determinative of Congress's power.
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the regulatory function quite as definitely as prohibitions or restrictions
thereon."1 65
Plainly, the Court's Commerce Clause case law manifests a consis-
tent rejection of hard and fast distinctions.1 6 6 The activity and inactivity
distinction should not be adopted because the validity of a congressional
act under the Commerce Clause often turns on whether there is a cumu-
lative substantial economic effect-never whether there is an activity or
inactivity. 167 Moreover, it is not logical to suppose that the Court would
reject the old typology of "production" versus "manufacturing" or that
of "direct" and "indirect" effects, but still intend to adopt an equally
formalistic distinction between "activity" and "inactivity."168 More than
half a century ago it was already a "late day" to take "that long back-
ward step." 1 69 The closest the Court has come to adopting such a formal-
istic distinction in modern times is that drawn in Lopez and Morrison
between economic and noneconomic activity. In both cases, the Court
concluded that the activity in question was noneconomic and declined to
allow its aggregate effects to serve as the basis for federal regulation.
The Court was careful, however, to emphasize that the distinction is not
absolute.170
Similarly, turning to the individual mandate, any distinction
between activity and inactivity contributes nothing to the analysis of its
constitutionality. The purchase of insurance under the individual man-
date could be viewed either as activity or as inactivity. Not purchasing
165. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 128 (1942).
166. See id. at 124 ("Whether the subject of the regulation in question was 'production,'
'consumption,' or 'marketing' is, therefore, not material for purposes of deciding the question of
federal power before us."); see also id. at 125 ("[E]ven if appellee's activity be local and though it
may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it
exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce and this irrespective of whether such
effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect."').
167. See id. at 126 (regulating home-consumed wheat because it had a substantial economic
effect on the market price in the aggregate).
168. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265, at
*107-08 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (Graham, J., dissenting) (noting that the "distinction would
suffer from the same failings as the 'direct' and 'indirect' effects test of prior Commerce Clause
jurisprudence").
169. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234-35 (1948)
(rejecting the sharp distinction between production and manufacturing, because "[alt this late day
we are not willing to take that long backward step"); id. at 229 ("The artificial and mechanical
separation of 'production' and 'manufacturing' from 'commerce,' without regard to their
economic continuity, the effects of the former two upon the latter, and the varying methods by
which the several processes are organized, related and carried on in different industries or indeed
within a single industry, no longer suffices to put either production or manufacturing and refining
processes beyond reach of Congress' authority . . . .").
170. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (noting that "we need not adopt a
categorical rule against aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity").
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insurance could be viewed as doing nothing."' It could also be viewed
as the activity of self-insuring.17 2 If Congress can prohibit the interstate
transportation of lottery tickets, why could it not prohibit the activity of
self-insuring? Health care expenses from emergency room visits, annual
checkups at a primary care physician, buying Tylenol at the grocery
store, and borrowing money from family members for an elective proce-
dure all have an economic effect. The cumulative economic effects of
those who self-insure (and in many cases simply shift costs onto others)
are enormous and doubtless far greater than those of the lottery tickets at
issue in Champion v. Ames.'73 Because individuals' lack of insurance
contributes to a national economic problem, Congress may regulate the
decision whether to purchase insurance as a part of a national solution in
the form of the PPACA and the individual mandate.
Of course, the Court need not agree with Congress's assessment of
the cause, extent, or importance of a problem in order to uphold a legis-
lative response to it. 17 4 The Commerce Clause does not give the judici-
ary the power to second-guess legislative policy determinations as to the
most appropriate way to deal with a national problem.17 1 Wickard did
not hold that the regulatory scheme at issue would in fact raise wheat
prices or that raising wheat prices was a good way to combat the
Depression. 6 Rather, it:
had no difficulty concluding that Congress had a rational basis for
believing that, when viewed in the aggregate, leaving home-con-
sumed wheat outside the regulatory scheme would have a substantial
influence on price and market conditions. [In Raich] too, Congress
had a rational basis for concluding that leaving home-consumed
marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect price and
market conditions.17 7
As Chief Justice Marshall observed in McCulloch v. Maryland,
"the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national
171. Though as noted earlier, in some instances-cancelling a policy-it could be viewed as
doing something. See supra Part III.C.I.
172. See Balkin, Commerce, supra note 12, at 46-47.
173. See 42 U.S.C.A § 18091(a)(2)(D) (West 2010) ("[T]he cost of providing uncompensated
care to the uninsured was $43,000,000,000 in 2008.").
174. See Balkin, Commerce, supra note 12, at 33 (noting that "[t]he Commerce Clause does
not require any particular answer to this question; it simply gives Congress the ability to solve
problems that it reasonably believes to exist") (emphasis added).
175. Id. at 34 ("By resolving the policy debate, Congress also resolves the constitutional
question, unless its conclusion is completely unreasonable.").
176. See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942) ("This record leaves [the Court] in
no doubt that Congress may properly have considered that wheat consumed on the farm . . . would
have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at
increased prices.").
177. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005).
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legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the pow-
ers it confers are to be carried into execution.""' Importing an easily
manipulated distinction between activity and inactivity into Commerce
Clause analysis not only is without basis in the Court's case law, but
also invites unwarranted judicial restriction of legislative flexibility to
deal with important social and economic problems.
2. VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY
The second distinction drawn in challenges to the constitutionality
of the individual mandate is that between voluntary and involuntary con-
duct as the subject or instance of regulation. The significance of this
distinction seems to be that because the mandate "compels an unwilling
person to perform an involuntary act," which in turn submits the person
to Commerce Clause regulation, it is therefore beyond Congress's power
(or at least constitutionally suspect).'7 9 The involuntariness of the indi-
vidual mandate is then distinguished from the regulations in Wickard
and Raich by claiming that growing wheat or marijuana represented con-
scious decisions by which the individuals "voluntarily placed them-
selves within the stream of interstate commerce." 80 The involuntariness
of the act is further highlighted by claims that the requirement to buy
insurance stems not from any voluntary act, but is imposed "just for
being alive."'
Some courts have accepted this argument.182 Other courts have
rejected the conclusion that the individual mandate is unconstitutional,
but have seemingly embraced the voluntary and involuntary distinction
in doing so. One court, for example, observed in the course of upholding
the individual mandate that the decision not to purchase health insurance
was a voluntary choice as to how-not whether-a person participates
in the health care market because "nearly everyone is a participant.""'
178. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
179. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 779 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(emphasis added).
180. See id. (emphasis added); see also Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs, No. 3:10-CV-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *23 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (noting that
"Congress has used its authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate individuals, employers,
and others who voluntarily take part in some type of economic activity") (emphasis added).
181. See Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *20 ("Never before has Congress required that everyone
buy a product from a private company (essentially for life) just for being alive and residing in the
United States.").
182. See, e.g., id. at *21 (holding the individual mandate unconstitutional because it regulates
inactivity); Cuccinelli, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 778-79 (holding the individual mandate
unconstitutional because it forces individual into a market regulated by Congress).
183. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 633 (W.D. Va. 2010) ("Regardless
of whether one relies on an insurance policy, one's savings, or the backstop of free or reduced-
cost emergency room services, one has made a choice regarding the method of payment for the
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The distinction between voluntary and involuntary conduct is no more
sound conceptually or defensible doctrinally than the distinction
between activity and inactivity.
a. Conceptual Analysis
The problem with a distinction between voluntary and involuntary
conduct is not that it is utterly impossible to formulate any difference at
all between them. The Court's own experience with this distinction in
other areas of the law, however, strongly suggests that the problems it
creates are vexing. Unless there is a good reason for introducing the
distinction into the Commerce Clause-and there is not-it should be
avoided.
There are at least two areas where current constitutional doctrine
does draw a distinction between voluntary and involuntary conduct.
Both relate to attempts to distinguish government-provided benefits
from governmental coercion. Determining whether a federal regulation
"coerces" the subject of a regulation or provides a choice-often a diffi-
cult choice-turns out to be a matter of fine line-drawing at best.
The distinction between voluntary and involuntary conduct at the
individual level has bedeviled the whole area of the "unconstitutional
conditions" doctrine. 184 Governments frequently place conditions on the
provision of a benefit. Whether the condition is upheld depends in part
on whether the government is seen to be encouraging an activity or is
coercing the individual.' This distinction between encouragement and
imposition-between voluntary acceptance of a condition and involun-
tary subjection to a mandate-shows up as well in the issue of federal
aid to the states. 186 As commentators have noted, drawing distinctions
between unconstitutional coercion and constitutional conditioning of
benefits has proven difficult, to say the least.187
health care services one expects to receive."); see also Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F.
Supp. 2d 882, 893 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (noting that the individual mandate "addresses economic
decisions regarding health care services that everyone eventually, and inevitably, will need").
184. STONE ET AL., supra note 96, at 1598-99 (discussing the "constitutionally troublesome
strings to government benefits" often associated with unconstitutional conditions and the benefit
and burden distinction).
185. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 476 (1977) ("Constitutional concerns are greatest
when the State attempts to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to encourage actions
deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.").
186. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (upholding a federal statute where
the government imposed conditions on federal highway funding).
187. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1911, 1972-74 (1995); David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DuKE L.J. 1, 81 (1994)
(claiming that the difficulty with this distinction is why the Court gives it no more than "lip
service" in practice); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413
(1989); Richard Epstein, The Supreme Court, 1987 Term-Foreword: Unconstitutional
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The same conceptual difficulties arise in the area of federal-state
relations. Under the Tenth Amendment, Congress may not commandeer
states, but it can induce them voluntarily to undertake action. It may
also induce individuals to undertake actions that, if made obligatory,
would fall outside the federal government's jurisdiction. Consider
United States v. Butler,189 where the Court held that a regulation under
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 was coercive because it was
"not in fact voluntary."1 90 The Act effectively placed a tax on farmers,
which was then used to fund subsidies to farmers who limited their per-
mitted level of production. Under then-prevailing Commerce Clause
doctrine, Congress lacked the power to regulate farm production, but the
Act was defended in part on the ground that it did not amount to a regu-
lation of farmers at all; farmers could voluntarily choose whether to
accept the subsidy and limit production, or reject it and grow as much as
they wanted. 191 The Court noted this argument, but held that this choice
was "illusory" because not accepting the subsidy would cause "financial
ruin."l 92 In dissent, Justice Stone countered that "[t]hreat of loss, not
hope of gain, is the essence of economic coercion," and rejected the
assertion that the farmers' decisions were not voluntary. 193 Notably, the
Court did not provide guidance on what level of economic pressure
would be consistent with true choice.
In contrast, another Tenth Amendment case decided one year after
Butler failed to find an impermissible level of coercion when a federal
unemployment tax gave employers a ninety-percent credit against the
federal tax for any state unemployment tax they had paid, but only on
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1988); Albert J.
Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1107-08
(1987).
188. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169-72 (1992) (striking down a federal statute
requiring states to "take title" to nuclear waste, but acknowledging that Congress may impose
conditions that are not unreasonable); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (upholding
a federal statute where the government imposed conditions on federal highway funding). The
Tenth Amendment is addressed here simply as a useful example of the conceptual difficulties a
voluntary and involuntary conduct distinction possesses. However, it should be noted that there
have been legal challenges under the Tenth Amendment to the PPACA. See, e.g., Complaint at 16,
Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 720 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (N.D.
Fla. 2010) (No. 3: 10-CV-91-RV/EMT), 2010 WL 1038209 (claiming that the Medicaid expansion
violates the Tenth Amendment). Nevertheless, this note does not specifically address the legal
challenges under the Tenth Amendment. For an analysis of those issues, see Rende M. Landers,
"Tomorrow" May Finally Have Arrived-The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act: A
Necessary First Step Toward Health Care Equity in the United States, 6 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L.
65 (2010).
189. 297 U.S. 1.
190. Id. at 70 (striking down the federal regulation).
191. Id. at 70-71.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 81 (Stone, J., dissenting).
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the condition that the state unemployment tax system met federal guide-
lines.' 94 Even though this scheme put enormous pressure on states to
conform their laws to the federal model, the Court rejected the claim that
states had been coerced into doing so.19 5 Continuing this reasoning, the
Court later upheld a federal statute that would result in withholding five
percent of federal highway funds from states that did not prohibit the
purchase of alcohol by people under the age of twenty-one in South
Dakota v. Dole.'9 6 This reduction in funds was not "so coercive as to
pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion. "" The Court
did not address whether, for example, withholding ten percent-or even
thirty percent-would be coercive. Instead, the Court emphasized that
withholding five percent of the federal funding was not an unconstitu-
tional "compulsion." 1 s As commentators have noted, distinguishing
coercion from inducement of voluntary conduct is exceedingly
difficult. 9
The question of whether the individual mandate is voluntary is by
no means immune from these difficulties. In one respect, the individual
mandate is entirely voluntary-the consequence of a failure to purchase
the minimum level of insurance is simply payment of a penalty.2 " An
individual might choose either to purchase insurance or to pay the pen-
alty, the difference lying only in the amount of money involved.2 01 In
another respect, the individual mandate is involuntary-individuals
might choose not to purchase insurance if there were no mandate, but
now are involuntarily forced to make this purchase in lieu of violating
federal law and suffering the imposition of a fine. The ease with which
the mandate can be seen as voluntary or involuntary undermines any
effort to draw a sharp distinction.
Under relevant precedent, could the PPACA's penalty be an eco-
194. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 574-76 (1937).
195. Id. at 589 ("Who then is coerced through the operation of this statute? Not the taxpayer.
He pays in fulfillment of the mandate of the local legislature. Not the state. Even now she does not
offer a suggestion that in passing the unemployment law she was affected by duress.").
196. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987).
197. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 590).
198. Id. (citing Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 590).
199. See sources cited supra note 187.
200. I.R.C. § 5000A(a) (West 2010) (stating that the PPACA imposes a penalty through an
individual's tax return).
201. See I.R.C. § 5000A(c) (stating the amount of the penalty). This thought process is similar
to Justice Holmes's "bad man." See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L.
REV. 457, 459 (1897) ("If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad
man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict,
not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the
vaguer sanctions of conscience.") (emphasis added).
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nomic pressure resulting in financial ruin?202 The congressional findings
in no way suggest that the penalty would be unduly burdensome on the
public to pay, but rather implicitly suggest that it does not reach the level
of compulsion because individuals who may have had the most difficul-
ties with paying the penalty are exempted.203 The unnecessary distinc-
tion between voluntary and involuntary conduct and what economic
pressures may constitute an unconstitutional level of coercion counsel
strongly against adding this distinction to Commerce Clause doctrine.
b. Constitutional Analysis
Beyond the elusiveness of the distinction between voluntary and
involuntary conduct, the Constitution does not expressly prohibit coer-
civeness under the Commerce Clause. On the contrary, coercion is the
essence of countless federal regulations. In fact, in Wickard v. Filburn,
the Court held that Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause
to force a wheat farmer into the market.204 This federal regulation was
valid because, in the aggregate, individual decisions to avoid the wheat
market would have a substantial effect on the "large and important"
wheat industry.2 05 Consequently, there inevitably would be individuals
who may be restrained in order to maintain advantages for most in one
market. 20 6
Further constitutional support for Congress's ability to "force" indi-
viduals into some action is drawn from the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.207 The Takings Clause provides that "private property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." 20 8 Prop-
202. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 70-71 (1936) (striking down the federal
regulation because the result of electing not to accept the benefits may be "financial ruin").
203. See I.R.C. § 5000A(e).
204. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942) ("It is said, however, that this Act, forcing
some farmers into the market to buy what they could provide for themselves, is an unfair
promotion of the markets and prices of specializing wheat growers.") (emphasis added).
205. Id. at 125.
206. Id. at 129 ("It is of the essence of regulation that it lays a restraining hand on the
selfinterest of the regulated and that advantages from the regulation commonly fall to others.").
207. See Rigdon, supra note 132, at 25. The comparison to the Takings Clause is done solely
to illustrate the notion of constitutional authority to "force" an individual into a market. It was
evident even before the enactment of the PPACA that the individual mandate would not be an
unconstitutional taking because the benefit obtained with the purchase of insurance would
necessarily offset the economic impact of the regulation. See JENNIFER STAMAN & CYNTHIA
BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40725, REQUIRING INDIVIDUALS TO OBTAIN HEALTH
INSURANCE: A CONSTrrrIONAL ANALYSIS 13 (2009) (relying on Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978)). Nevertheless, whether or not the requirement to purchase
insurance under the individual mandate is an unconstitutional taking is irrelevant to the purpose of
this note.
208. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Modem justifications for the forced exchange of property by an
individual to the government is based on a monopoly theory, which seeks to prevent an undue
[Vol. 66:259290
FUNDAMENTAL MISMATCH
erty can be taken for public purposes (with just compensation), and a
forced transfer of private property from one private owner to another can
serve a public purpose, as Kelo v. City of New London illustrates.20 9
Kelo thus stands for the proposition that, consistent with the Constitu-
tion, an individual can be forced to sell to another private person.210
To be sure, not every conceivable forced sale of property by one
individual to another would be upheld. Kelo would invalidate a taking
"for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on a particular private
party," which would be "a purely private taking."21 1 What would invali-
date the governmental action, however, is not the fact that an individual
was being forced to sell his or her property, but rather that the particular
type of transfer would not satisfy the "public use" requirement.212
Where the "public use" requirement is satisfied, however, forcing an
individual to sell to another private person is constitutionally valid-a
proposition with which eight of the nine Justices agreed.213
burden on taxpayers. See DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 27-32
(2002). An individual has a monopoly power when a voluntary exchange is not feasible. Id.
("Eminent domain offers a solution to this kind of monopoly problem. If the government
condemns the land, it can acquire a needed resource without providing a windfall to the landowner
or without imposing an undue burden on taxpayers.") (emphasis added). The PPACA has been
challenged as an unlawful taking in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See,
e.g., Bryant v. Holder, No. 2:10-CV-76-KS-MTP, 2011 WL 710693, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 3,
2011) (discussing claims that the PPACA is an "unconstitutional taking").
209. See Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). In 2005, the city of New London,
Connecticut approved a large economic development plan to revitalize the city's economy. Id. at
473. In assembling the land required for the project, the city's development agent would purchase
property voluntarily from willing sellers. Id. at 472. More important, the agent planned to use the
power of eminent domain to acquire property from owners who would not voluntarily sell their
homes. Id. Those unwilling owners were forced to enter a transaction of selling their homes in
exchange for "just compensation." Id. The primary issue in Kelo was defining what actions satisfy
the "public use" requirement of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 477. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held
that the city's use of the eminent domain power in furtherance of an economic development plan
satisfied the "public use" requirement of the Takings Clause. Id. at 489.
210. See id. at 489. Kelo involved a taking by a local government, which was subject to the
Fifth Amendment through its incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment, but the same standard
would apply in the case of the federal government. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
211. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477 (quoting Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245
(1984)).
212. Id. at 486-87.
213. Justice Kennedy signed with the majority, but his separate concurrence is in line with this
proposition. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 492-93 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that "private transfers"
are valid but their purposes are likely to be inherently more suspect than a government taking).
Justice O'Connor's dissent would also allow the government to take property and transfer it to
private parties if the initial taking eliminated some "harmful property use." Id. at 501 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). Only Justice Thomas's separately written dissent would not agree with the
proposition. Id. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting). His opinion does not have any exceptions or
contingencies to the general rule with regard to private takings, by firmly stating that "the
government may take property only if it actually uses or gives the public a legal right to use the
property." Id.
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If an individual can be forced to sell property to another private
individual or entity in order to achieve some public benefit, it is hard to
see why the Constitution would flatly prohibit forcing an individual to
purchase something from another private entity. To put it another way,
there is no reason why the power to force individuals into the market
should be deemed consistent with the Constitution when the forced
transaction is a sale, but denied when it is a purchase. Granted, Kelo
concerned the Fifth Amendment, not the Commerce Clause. 2 14 The Fifth
Amendment, however, is part of the Bill of Rights. It is hard to see why
a forced sale would be within the federal government's power under the
Bill of Rights-designed to protect individual liberty-but forbidden by
the Commerce Clause-designed to address federalism concerns.
3. UNIQUENESS
The third distinction drawn in challenges to the individual mandate
rests on contentions about uniqueness. The Sixth Circuit referred to the
unique nature of the market.215 In contrast to the distinctions between
activity and inactivity or voluntariness and involuntariness, this distinc-
tion has played a role in arguments supporting the individual mandate as
well as arguments challenging it. Either way, however, the distinction
has nothing to add to Commerce Clause analysis.
One argument focuses on the claimed uniqueness of the market reg-
ulated by the PPACA. From this perspective, the health care market is
unique because of billions of dollars involved in the "phenomenon of
cost-shifting." 216 The prospect of cost-shifting on such a large scale is
said to create a unique problem, which Congress must have the power to
address. 2 17 An opposing perspective focuses on the alleged uniqueness
214. See id. at 477 (majority opinion).
215. See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265, at
*47 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) ("The vast majority of individuals are active in the market for health
care delivery because of two unique characteristics of this market: (1) virtually everyone requires
health care services at some unpredictable point; and (2) individuals receive health care services
regardless of ability to pay."). But see id. at 117-19 (Graham, J., dissenting) (rejecting relevance
of claim uniqueness of the market).
216. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 894 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (claiming
that "by choosing to forgo insurance plaintiffs are making an economic decision to try to pay for
health care services later, out of pocket, rather than now through the purchase of insurance,
collectively shifting billions of dollars, $43 billion in 2008, on to other market participants").
217. Congress expressly stated that the individual mandate was "essential" to the success of the
PPACA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(G) (West 2010) (stating that "the requirement is essential to
creating effective health insurance markets in which improved health insurance products that are
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold") (emphasis
added). The government has relied on this contention by arguing that the individual mandate "is a
necessary measure to ensure success of its larger reforms of the interstate health insurance
market." See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 776 (E.D. Va. 2010).
However, not every court upholding the mandate has viewed the alleged uniqueness of the market
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of the individual mandate itself. The mandate is often described as an
unprecedented-or unique-federal intrusion into individuals' lives.218
The uniqueness of the exercise of congressional power is said, at the
very least, to cast grave doubt on its validity.
Whether offered in support of or in opposition to the constitutional-
ity of the individual mandate, this focus on uniqueness is deeply mis-
guided. The claims of uniqueness on either side are not supportable
under Commerce Clause doctrine. Moreover, to focus on the nature of
the market or the regulatory imposition as "unique" is to miss the core of
Commerce Clause analysis, which concerns maintaining the appropriate
balance between state and federal power.
a. Uniqueness of the Market
Introducing a distinction between unique markets and other markets
would be unhelpful to Commerce Clause doctrine for several reasons.
First, the health care market is not the only market that could be called
"unique;" to put it another way, regulation often faces what might plau-
sibly be called unique challenges.219 Courts that call a market or a prob-
as decisive. See Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 633 (W.D. Va. 2010)
(upholding the individual mandate based on "the well-settled principles expounded in Raich and
Wickard"); Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-CV-91-RV/
EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *33 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (striking down the mandate despite
accepting that it was "essential").
218. See Thomas More Law Ctr., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13265, at *77; Bondi, 2011 WL
285683, at *20 ("Never before has Congress required that everyone buy a product from a private
company (essentially for life) just for being alive and residing in the United States."); Thomas
More Law Ctr., 720 F. Supp. 2d at 893 (noting that the regulation "arguably presents an issue of
first impression"). The idea that an individual mandate might be unique long predates the current
controversy. See Memo, Cong. Budget Office, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual
Mandate to Buy Health Insurance, Aug. 1994 ("A mandate requiring all individuals to purchase
health insurance would be an unprecedented form of federal action.").
219. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 729 (1975)
(noting that the Investment Company Act immunizes mutual funds from antitrust liability under
certain circumstances because "Congress has made a judgment that these restrictions on
competition might be necessitated by the unique problems of the mutual-fund industry"); Ricci v.
Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 305 (1973) (deferring to Commodity Exchange Commission
because it was "familiar with the customs and practices of the industry and of the unique market-
place involved in this case"); Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien
(Swedish Am. Line), 390 U.S. 238, 253 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that the Act was
"intended to comprehend factors unique to the shipping industry"); United States v. Drum, 368
U.S. 370, 384 (1962) (upholding ICC determination that certain truck drivers were "contract
carriers" subject to federal permit requirement where the ICC "allowably dealt with this novel
situation as an integral and unique problem in judgment, rather than simply as an exercise in
counting common-places"); United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 454-63
(1953) (Clark, J., dissenting) (arguing for congressional power to regulate certain gambling
devices in part on the ground that "the situation here is unique"); Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v.
Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 239-40 (1948) (taking the sugar beet industry's "unique
character" into account in finding it subject to federal antitrust law).
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lem unique are best understood as imprecisely expressing the issue of
how much discretion Congress should have under the Commerce Clause
to resolve difficult practical problems. If anything, as Justice Frankfurter
observed, the sense that a problem is unique should counsel against
application of rigid tests and distinctions.2 20 To turn uniqueness into a
general assessment of Congress's power would require developing a test
of what is truly unique-a daunting and likely unproductive task. Most
likely, any court that incorporated uniqueness into Commerce Clause
doctrine would in effect grant itself nearly unlimited discretion to pass
on the wisdom of the regulation.
Second, even if a principled version of such a test could be devel-
oped, it would play no useful role in legal analysis under the Commerce
Clause. Uniqueness of a market or problem could not possibly be a nec-
essary condition for the exercise of federal power. It would make no
sense to rule out federal regulation on the ground that the market or
problem addressed exhibited no unique characteristics. More important,
it should not be a sufficient condition for the exercise of federal power.
As the Supreme Court stated in Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blais-
dell,2 21 an emergency does not create regulatory power. If an emergency
does not do so, it is difficult to see why uniqueness should.2 22
For a court to observe that comprehensive regulation of the private
health insurance market poses complex and interrelated problems, the
resolution of which should be left primarily to Congress, is one thing.
To justify the exercise of that power on the ground of the uniqueness of
220. Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 529 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(noting that in "unique situations especially we should heed our admonition against perverting 'the
process of interpretation by mechanically applying definitions in unintended contexts.' In law as
elsewhere words of many-hued meanings derive their scope from the use to which they are put."
(quoting Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 764 (1949))).
221. 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934) ("Emergency does not increase granted power or remove or
diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved. The Constitution was adopted
in a period of grave emergency.").
222. As Judge Graham put it in his dissent:
The government recites the common refrain that the health insurance market is
unique and attributes this to some blend of free-riding, adverse selection, universal
participation, and unpredictability as to when and how much care might be needed.
This should comfort the court, the government says, because Congress will not need
to resort to such measures as the mandate again, or at least not very often.
This assurance is troubling on many levels and should hardly be heard to come
from a body with limited powers. The uniqueness that justifies one exercise of
power becomes precedent for the next contemplated exercise. And permitting the
mandate would clear the path for Congress to cause or contribute to certain
"unique" factors, such as free-riding and adverse selection, and then impose a
solution that is ill-fitted to the others.




the problem or the market is another. Commerce Clause analysis of the
individual mandate is best left with the focus on whether the PPACA's
reforms of the private health insurance market, including the imposition
of the individual mandate, constitute "appropriate legislation" for the
"protection or advancement" of commerce.223
b. Uniqueness of the Regulation
The alleged uniqueness of the individual mandate itself should
equally be irrelevant to Commerce Clause analysis. Here, too, the con-
ceptual difficulties are daunting. What constitutes uniqueness is a matter
of category. If the category is "required purchases of insurance," there is
nothing unique about the mandate. Individuals are routinely required to
purchase automobile insurance. If the category is "required acts or omis-
sions imposed on individuals just for being alive," mandates to buy
health insurance and to refrain from killing others both fall in this cate-
gory.224 Of course, if the category is "required purchases of health insur-
ance," by definition the regulation is unique. But then so is any other
federal regulation if phrased in sufficiently specific terms.
To pick and choose among such easily manipulated categorical def-
initions of this type is to risk straying from sound constitutional analysis
toward judicial activism. Any concerted attempt to distinguish between
ordinary or familiar kinds of congressional regulation and unique or
unprecedented exercises of federal power would encounter precisely the
same problems that led the Court to relinquish its decade-long effort to
distinguish between "traditional governmental functions" and other
functions under the Tenth Amendment. In 1976, the Court ruled in
National League of Cities v. Usery that Congress could not regulate state
activities when states engaged in "traditional governmental func-
tions."225 Nine years later, the Court overturned Usery, because the dis-
tinction between what was "traditional" and what was not simply invited
judicial activism.22 6 Having buried one untenable distinction relating to
the nature of the governmental power exercised, the Court should not
introduce a new one with the same elasticity.
In sum, the uniqueness distinction in the market or the regulation
223. See NRLB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1937).
224. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-CV-91-RV/
EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *20 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (claiming that the mandate affects
people "just for being alive and residing in the United States").
225. Nat'1 League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
226. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546 ("Any rule of state immunity that looks to the 'traditional,'
'integral,' or 'necessary' nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal
judiciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes.").
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itself has no constitutional basis under the Commerce Clause. Unique-
ness should be invoked neither in support of the individual mandate, nor
against it. As with the previously discussed distinctions regarding activ-
ity and voluntariness, the alleged uniqueness of a market or a regulation
simply misses the point of constitutional authority under the Commerce
Clause.
IV. THE LIBERTY CLAIM UNDERLYING CHALLENGES TO THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PPACA
What explains the emphasis on these new distinctions? The concep-
tual difficulties and lack of constitutional support under the Commerce
Clause certainly are not sufficient to do so. Instead, these distinctions
represent an attempt to shift Commerce Clause analysis away from its
well-settled federalism principles to a focus on individual liberty. This
effort is nothing new. There is a history of efforts to show that congres-
sional legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause violates
some implicit-and typically poorly articulated-liberty right.2 27 The
Court has rejected these claims in the past and should do so here with
respect to the individual mandate.
Any claim that the mandate infringes on the Constitution should be
articulated squarely in terms of an individual substantive due process
right that encompasses the right not to purchase health insurance. While
this note will not seek to show whether or not that substantive due pro-
cess right exists, it will demonstrate that the argument for it is far from
clear. And that is what counts. Articulating it as a substantive due pro-
cess right exposes its weakness; smuggling it in as a Commerce Clause
argument obscures it. Sound constitutional analysis proceeds in a man-
ner that exposes rather than hides the fundamental-and difficult-
questions.
A. The Relationship Between Federalism Concerns and Individual
Liberty Rights in the Commerce Clause
Judicial enforcement of both the Commerce Clause and the Tenth
Amendment is, in the first instance, about enforcing the proper balance
between state and federal power. The Court struck down the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act to enforce this balance in Printz v.
United States.228 Enacted pursuant to Congress's Commerce Clause
authority, the Brady Act required state officials to run background
227. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-60 (1964)
(rejecting a claimed liberty right in a case based on whether the "racial discrimination by motels
affected commerce").
228. See 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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checks on prospective handgun purchasers as part of a national federal
scheme for distribution of firearms. 2 2 9 The Court held that such com-
mands are "fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system
of dual sovereignty." 23 0
This balance maintains the accountability central to democracy. In
New York v. United States,2 3 1 the Court struck down a federal regulation
of nuclear waste on this accountability basis. The Low-Level Radioac-
tive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 required states to provide
for disposal of waste generated within their borders; those not in compli-
ance would be forced to "take title" to all waste generated within the
state or regulate it according to federal criteria.232 Either way, states
were not simply encouraged by the federal government to regulate, but
were compelled to do so. 2 3 3 Allowing such compulsion, the Court rea-
soned, diminished "the accountability of both state and federal offi-
cials."234 Moreover, the importance of maintaining this accountability
remains in the Court's Commerce Clause cases as well.235 To some
extent this accountability is maintained by the national political process,
which, as the Court observed in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, "systematically protects States from the risk of having
their functions in that area handicapped by Commerce Clause regula-
tion." 2 36 But as New York and Printz make clear, the Court also has a
role in protecting accountability.
The judicial protection of accountability indirectly helps preserve
individual liberty. In the extreme instance, it may prevent the federal
government from becoming tyrannical. More generally, accountabil-
ity promotes democracy, and democracy tends to help protect individual
229. Id. at 902-04.
230. Id. at 935.
231. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
232. Id. at 150-54.
233. See id. at 174-75 (holding that the "take title" provision "crossed the line distinguishing
encouragement from coercion").
234. Id. at 168.
But where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state
officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials
who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decision. Accountability is thus diminished when, due to
federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views
of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.
Id. at 169.
235. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (noting that the
"effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the States' interests is apparent even
today in the course of federal legislation").
236. Id. at 555.
237. See Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69
BROOK. L. REv. 1231, 1274-75 (2004) (arguing that Tenth Amendment limitations on the federal
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rights. This series of steps from judicial protection of accountability to
individual rights, however, hardly supports an argument that the Com-
merce Clause or the Tenth Amendment directly preserves individual
liberty.238
Nevertheless, there is a history of liberty-based attacks on congres-
sional exercises of power under the Commerce Clause focusing on the
Thirteenth Amendment, which prohibits slavery.23 9 In the first half of
the twentieth century, labor unions repeatedly challenged federal court
injunctions against strikes as violations of the Thirteenth Amendment.
These arguments were uniformly rejected by the Court.24 0 The civil
rights legislation of the 1960s was also challenged as a violating the
Thirteenth Amendment. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
the motel owner argued that application of the Civil Rights Act required
the motel to provide accommodation to African-Americans and "against
its will," which, the motel owner asserted, constituted "involuntary ser-
vitude."" The Court summarily rejected this claim too.242 The congres-
sional mandate that local law enforcement officers run a background
check on gun purchasers was likewise challenged in federal district court
government's power to commandeer the states could protect liberty in times of national
emergency, when the threat to individual rights from an over-reaching government is at its peak).
238. Of course, as a matter of standing, the Commerce Clause can be invoked by individuals to
protect them from federal legislation. Consequently, this might, for that individual, directly protect
liberty. To illustrate, Alfonso Lopez, Jr. was shielded from prosecution and imprisonment under
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 by virtue of its invalidity under the Commerce Clause.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). But the substantive analysis in the case
concerned the maintenance of a "healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government," not the direct protection of an individual right to carry a gun. Id. at 552 (quoting
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)). In contrast, the analysis in District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), decided under the Second Amendment, concerned precisely that
individual right.
239. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
240. See James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor
and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1957, 102 COLum. L. REV. 1, 104-12
(2002); see also Risa L. Goluboff, The Thirteenth Amendment and the Lost Origins of Civil
Rights, 50 DuKE L.J. 1609, 1674-80 (2001) (noting that in the 1940s and 1950s, the U.S. Justice
Department's Civil Rights Section saw the Thirteenth Amendment as protecting the rights of
workers to unionize); id. at 1676 ("When the Section broadened the definition of involuntary
servitude to include 'peonage-like' and abhorrent conditions, it targeted not only legal but also
social and economic obstacles to free labor."); id at 1683 (noting the "Thirteenth Amendment's
doctrinal eclipse" from the mid-1950s on).
241. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 244 (1964).
242. Id. at 261. Using the Thirteenth Amendment to attack civil rights legislation is ironic
because, if anything, the Thirteenth Amendment might provide an alternative basis for upholding
it. See Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights & the Thirteenth
Amendment, 45 B.C. L. REV. 307, 352 (2004) (noting that "[o]ddly, it was the Motel that raised
the Thirteenth Amendment claim").
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as violating the Thirteenth Amendment.24 3 In rejecting the claim, the
court made clear that Congress could require a "painful" choice on the
part of a local law enforcement officer to comply with the law or to
resign as sheriff; the existence of that choice precluded it from triggering
a Thirteenth Amendment violation. 24
Conceptually, the legal challenges to the individual mandate as
coercing individuals into activity amount to a veiled form of the earlier
Thirteenth Amendment arguments.245 The argument would be that being
forced to purchase health insurance-an obligation imposed on individ-
uals just for existing-constitutes involuntary servitude.24 6 For oppo-
nents of the individual mandate, the argument would carry a powerful
attraction, making the mandate presumptively beyond Congress's power
by lumping it in with slavery.
The argument would fail, however, for two reasons. First, as noted
earlier, encouragement-some level of coercion-is the essence of regu-
lation.2" Applying a presumption of unconstitutionality to a regulation
because it coerces individuals implicitly amounts to the application of
strict scrutiny, which has no place in Commerce Clause doctrine. Sec-
ond, the mandate is not coercive in any sense related to the evils the
Thirteenth Amendment was intended to abolish. For one thing, individu-
als subject to the mandate do not have to purchase insurance; they sim-
ply have to pay a fine if they do not. Even if the penalty were
imprisonment, however, being forced to buy insurance could not reason-
ably be compared to being enslaved.
243. Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1382 (D. Ariz. 1994), rev'd on other grounds,
66 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1996). A
violation of an individual's Thirteenth Amendment right requires proof that of being "'forced to
work for the defendant by the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury' or by law,
rather than mere psychological coercion." Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1382 (quoting United States v.
Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988)). Additionally, the Thirteenth Amendment is not violated if
an individual can "refuse to work without incurring legal sanctions ... even if the choice is a
painful one." Id.
244. See Mack, 66 F.3d at 1034 (noting that "[u]nlike a slave, however, Mack can quit work at
any time"); see also id. (discussing how performing "certain duties as a condition of his
employment, does not violate the Thirteenth Amendment" ) (citing United States v. 30.64 Acres
of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 800-01 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that "requiring lawyers to perform pro
bono services does not violate Thirteenth Amendment because requirement is a condition of
practicing law")).
245. Thus, Professor Barnett's "anti-commandeering" argument is nothing more than the
discredited claim that forcing motel owners to provide rooms to people they would rather exclude
is involuntary servitude. See Heart ofAtlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 244 (rejecting the motel owner's
involuntary servitude argument).
246. This argument would at least have the merit of applying both to the state and federal
governments.
247. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (upholding a federal statute
where the government imposed conditions on federal highway funding).
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Certainly there is no reason to think that a Thirteenth Amendment
argument against the PPACA would meet a different fate from its earlier
incarnations. The Court would summarily reject it. Not surprisingly, the
Thirteenth Amendment has played no role in the legal challenges to the
individual mandate before the courts,248 though it is a common argument
in the blogosphere. 249
The interest of the Thirteenth Amendment lies not in any possibil-
ity that the Court will find the individual mandate to violate it. Rather, it
lies in the fact that the argument of the most prominent proponent of the
unconstitutionality of the individual mandate amounts to the same thing
in different language. Professor Barnett argues eloquently that the indi-
vidual mandate violates an "anti-commandeering" principle of the Con-
stitution. 250 He draws on a variety of sources to create this theory and
grounds the principle in the "substantial effects" prong of the Commerce
Clause, which he considers derived from the Necessary and Proper
Clause of the Constitution. 251 This "substantial effects" doctrine
"implicitly limit[s] the use of 'necessary and proper' means to execute
Congress's power over interstate commerce."252 Even if the individual
mandate is "necessary," Professor Barnett claims that the individual
mandate must "also [be] a 'proper' means to the end of regulating inter-
state commerce." 253 It is not proper because the Constitution does not
248. See, e.g., Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v.
Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010) (No. 3:10-CV-188-HEH), 2010 WL 1038397
(failing to allege a Thirteenth Amendment violation); First Amended Complaint for Declaratory,
Preliminary & Permanent Injunctive Relief, Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611
(W.D. Va. 2010) (No. 6:10-CV-00015-NKM), 2010 WL 5867473 (same).
249. See, e.g., Does the Individual Mandate Abolish the 13th Amendment?, SODAHEAD (Feb. 3,
2011), http://www.sodahead.com/united-states/does-the-individual-mandate-abolish-the-13th-
amendment-if-govemment-can-force-you-to-buy-insuranc/question-1488353/; Anthony Gregory,
Judge Hudson is Right About the Individual Mandate, TENTH AMENDMENT CTR. BLOG (Dec. 14,
2010, 7:34 AM), http://blog.tenthamendmentcenter.com/2010/12/judge-hudson-is-right-about-the-
individual-mandatel (noting that "being forced to fill out forms to apply for insurance is in tension
with the 13th Amendment's prohibition of 'involuntary servitude"'). It is most commonly found
in comments on blogs. See, e.g., JamesJoyce, Comment to Progressives Shouldn't Defend the
Individual Mandate: The Difference Between Ideology and Blind Partisan Defense, FDL (Aug. 6,
2010, 4:29 PM), http://fdlaction.firedoglake.com/2010/08/06/progressives-shouldnt-defend-the-
individual-mandate-the-difference-between-ideology-and-blind-partisan-defense/ (noting that
"[t]he 13th Amendment along with the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment makes the
present federal Healthcare Reform Law's Individual mandate unconstitutional. State requirements
imposing [the] same are also unconstitutional").
250. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 621-34. Professor Barnett also addresses the taxing power.
See id. at 607-13. However, a complete analysis of this issue is not necessary for this note's
purpose. See supra Part HlI.B.
251. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 604 (claiming that "the substantial effects doctrine is not a
pure application of the Commerce Clause, but is actually an assertion of the Necessary and Proper
Clause to reach activity that is neither interstate nor commerce").
252. Id. at 591-92.
253. Id. at 621.
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permit the imposition of duties on individuals just for being citizens-as
opposed to duties contingent on engaging in an activity.254
Professor Barnett then lists exceptions to this principle. They fall
into a narrow class derived from "traditionally recognized fundamental
duties of citizenship" and include duties to "register for the draft and
serve if called, sit on a jury, fill out a census form, and file a tax
return." 255 These exceptions are contrasted with other provisions of the
Constitution that, he claims, reflect an anti-commandeering principle.
The first provision-and the main one-is the Tenth Amendment,
which the Court has read to prohibit the federal government from com-
mandeering the states.256 Because the Tenth Amendment reserves pow-
ers not delegated to the federal government to the states or the people, he
reads it as embodying a prohibition on "commandeering" the people.257
Second, Professor Barnett refers to other "express prohibitions on com-
mandeering the people" in the text of the Bill of Rights.25 8 Revealingly,
he also grounds his principle in the Thirteenth Amendment.259
The anti-commandeering principle may have garnered some sup-
port in federal courts, but the theory has two fundamental problems.260
First, any attempt to found it in the Necessary and Proper Clause is mis-
conceived. Professor Barnett overlooks the holding in McCulloch v.
Maryland that the Necessary and Proper Clause is not a limitation on
congressional power.26 1 Consistent with nearly 200 years of case law,
the Supreme Court recently gave the Necessary and Proper Clause an
expansive reading.26 2 Yet, Professor Barnett claims that United States v.
Comstock "offers little, if any, support for the individual mandate."2 63
Instead, he supports his reading of the clause with Justice Scalia's con-
254. See id. at 630 (claiming that "mandates are different than regulations that tell persons who
choose to engage in economic activity how they must do so-or that prohibit certain activities
altogether").
255. Id. at 630-31.
256. See id. at 622 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992)).
257. See id. at 626 (claiming that "the letter of the Tenth Amendment is not limited to states").
258. Id. at 629-30 (discussing the prohibition to mandate the quartering of soldiers during
times of peace, testifying against themselves in a criminal case, and "commandeer[ing] private
property for private use").
259. Id. at 631 (claiming that "unless the Court could find an affirmative duty of citizenship on
which to base conscription, the Thirteenth Amendment's general prohibition on commandeering
the labor of the people would clearly apply").
260. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp.
2d 1120, 1160 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (citing to a forthcoming draft of Professor Barnett's article in
support of the court's ruling).
261. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 419 (1819) ("The clause is placed
among the powers of congress, not among the limitations on those powers.").
262. See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). Professor Barnett concedes that
the opinion was an "expansive reading." See Barnett, supra note 5, at 625.
263. Barnett, supra note 5, at 625.
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currence in Gonzales v. Raich.2 64 He minimizes the significance of the
majority opinions of Comstock and Raich on the ground that Justice
Breyer (in Comstock) and Justice Stevens (in Raich) allegedly diluted
the holdings to attract votes. 265 This bold assertion cannot suffice to
elevate Justice Scalia's concurrence in Raich over actual precedent. But
even so, Justice Scalia may have been saying that the Necessary and
Proper Clause cannot be used as some amorphous basis for upholding
congressional power.266 Interpreting Justice Scalia's concurrence in this
manner is different from Professor Barnett's effort to use the Necessary
and Proper clause as a limitation on Congress's power.267
This basic misreading of the Necessary and Proper Clause might
not, however, prove fatal to Professor Barnett's anti-commandeering
argument because his theory could also be grounded in the Tenth
Amendment.268 However, the argument under the Tenth Amendment
fails for three reasons. First, the text of the Amendment has been
referred to by the Court as a "truism" over the years for good reason.2 69
Only the "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution"
are reserved to the states or to the people.270 As shown in Part III, how-
ever, the power to regulate the health insurance market, including the
power to mandate individuals to purchase insurance, is delegated to the
federal government under the Commerce Clause.27 ' Thus the Tenth
Amendment is inapplicable. Holding otherwise would be inconsistent
with Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.27 2 In that
case, which Professor Barnett fails to cite, the Court rejected the use of
the Tenth Amendment as a substantive limit on the scope of Congress's
regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause.273 A decade earlier in
National League of Cities v. Usery, the Court had ruled that Congress
did not have the power to regulate wages paid to state employees, at
264. Id. at 624 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
265. Id. at 602 (claiming that the majority opinion of Raich "had to be written in such a fashion
as to attract Justice Kennedy's fifth vote, which it did"); id. at 624-25 (claiming that the majority
opinion of Comstock "may well have been so written to attract the vote of Chief Justice Roberts").
266. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that "the nature of the Necessary
and Proper Clause ... empowers Congress to enact laws in effectuation of its enumerated powers
that are not within its authority to enact in isolation").
267. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 624-25 (citing Raich, 545 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
268. Id. at 624 (claiming that the "doctrine barring the commandeering of states has, however,
come to be associated primarily with the Tenth Amendment").
269. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941) (noting that "[t]he
amendment states but a truism . . ."); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992)
(noting that "it is in this sense that the Tenth Amendment 'states but a truism ... '") (quoting
Darby, 312 U.S. at 124).
270. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
271. See supra Part IH.B.
272. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
273. Id. at 555.
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least where the employees engaged in an activity that was part of a
"traditional government function."2 7 4 Garcia overruled Usery and once
again upheld the plenary reach of Congress's regulatory power under the
Commerce Clause.275
Second, the non-textual principle on which the Court has grounded
its "Tenth Amendment" prohibition on commandeering the states is fun-
damentally, a structural matter-not one of directly protecting individual
liberty rights.2 76 The Court made it clear in New York and Printz that
what the Tenth Amendment protects is a meaningful role for the states in
a federal system. 2 7 7 It has recognized this principle in part to respect the
Framers' intent,278 and in part to maintain political accountability.279
There simply is nothing in the Court's Tenth Amendment cases that
speaks of a general principle prohibiting the "commandeering" of
individuals.2 80
In an effort to address this problem, Professor Barnett draws an
analogy to the prohibition of federal authority to commandeer a state to
enact legislation in New York, calling individual decision-making power
274. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
275. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557.
276. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992) ("Whether one views the take
title provision as lying outside Congress' enumerated powers, or as infringing upon the core of
state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with the federal
structure of our Government established by the Constitution.").
277. See New York, 505 U.S. at 157 (claiming that the "Tenth Amendment confirms that the
power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power
to the States"); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 927 (1997) (discussing the principles of
federalism and how it "is an essential attribute of the States' retained sovereignty that they remain
independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of authority").
278. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 919-20 (discussing how the "Framers rejected the concept of a
central government that would act upon and through the States, and instead designed a system in
which the State and Federal Governments would exercise concurrent authority over the people").
279. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168 (discussing the importance of maintaining "the
accountability of both state and federal officials").
280. Professor Hall makes an excellent point that Justice Scalia-whom Professor Barnett
often appears to rely for his argument-wrote the majority opinion in District of Columbia v.
Heller, which explicitly noted that the Tenth Amendment does not apply to individual rights:
[The First, Fourth and Ninth Amendments] unambiguously refer to individual
rights, not "collective" rights, or rights that may be exercised only through
participation in come corporate body.
Three provisions of the Constitution refer to "the people" in a context other
than "rights"-the famous preamble ("We the people"), § 2 of Article I (providing
that "the people" will choose members of the House), and the Tenth Amendment
(providing that those powers not given the Federal Government remain with "the
States" or "the people"). Those provisions arguably refer to "the people" acting
collectively-but they deal with the exercise or reservation of powers, not rights.
Hall, supra note 112 at 24 (citation omitted).
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a "private legislative power."21 But this type of analogy has no limits.
For example, is the exercise of this "private legislative power" subject to
the strictures of the Bill of Rights? A negative answer undercuts the
whole analogy. An affirmative answer would destroy the distinction
between state action and private conduct-a distinction that has been
embedded in the Court's case law since The Civil Rights Cases.2 82
Professor Barnett further argues that the individual mandate under-
mines political accountability because Congress should have imposed a
tax on individuals rather than "compelling citizens to make payments
directly to private companies. "283 However, this flatly contradicts the
political reality that of the PPACA's many provisions, the individual
mandate has been the most controversial. All evidence points to the con-
clusion that people know perfectly well that Congress is responsible for
the fact that they will have to carry health insurance or pay a penalty.2 84
To suggest an accountability problem like the one in New York is to
revel in the same obliviousness to reality that the Court has dismissed in
the past.285
Third, even if there were an anti-commandeering principle with
respect to individuals, Professor Barnett notes that it is subject to excep-
tions. Could not the duty to purchase health insurance be one of them?
In concluding that "Americans instinctively sense that empowering Con-
gress to commandeer the people to engage in economic activities would
fundamentally change the relationship between themselves and their
government," Professor Barnett fails to notice that it was these allegedly
commandeering-averse Americans who elected the Congress that
approved the individual mandate.286 A more reasonable approach would
recognize that at least some significant segment of the public might
regard health care as a fundamental right, and view the task of making
sure it is available to all a basic function of the government. Consider an
American's right to a trial by jury. This entails an obligation to serve on
a jury. Similarly, so might a right to health care entail an obligation not
281. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 629 ("Mandating that individuals exercise their private
legislative power is as fundamental an intrusion into popular sovereignty as mandating that states
employ their legislative powers violates state sovereignty."); see also New York, 505 U.S. at 175.
282. See 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
283. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 632.
284. See Carl Hulse et al., After Health Vote, Democrats are Threatened with Violence, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010, at A18 (reporting death threats to members of Congress who voted in favor
of the bill).
285. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 228 (1948)
(observing, in rejecting beet sugar refiners' attempt to limit the scope of the Sherman Act, that the
refiners' proposed reading of the Act and the Commerce Clause "very nearly denies that sugar
beets contain sugar").
286. See Barnett, supra note 5, at 631.
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to shift costs onto others by self-insuring and then relying on others to
pay for medical care in case of emergency or life-threatening illness.
The evidence that a substantial segment of the public might view
health care as a fundamental right is not hard to find. One of the tradi-
tional "police powers" of states is the protection of public health."'
Nearly a third of states' constitutions recognize a right to health care,
either implicitly or explicitly.28 8 In his famous State of the Union
address in 1944, President Roosevelt declared that Americans have a
"right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy
good health." 28 9 The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops
recently reaffirmed that "access to health care is a basic human right and
a requirement of human dignity." 29 0 The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights-the promotion of which the United States State Depart-
ment describes as a "central goal of U.S. foreign policy" 29 1-also recog-
nizes a right to medical care.292
In contrast, Professor Barnett offers a version of the "American
exceptionalism" that has lately become a rallying cry for some conserva-
tive politicians.293 He asserts that "[w]hat separates the United States
287. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (upholding mandatory vaccinations as
part of the "police powers" of a state). Granted, states, not the federal government, have police
powers. But in deciding whether there is some fundamental limit on commandeering
individuals-a limit that would logically be applicable to both the states and the federal
government-the scope of the police power is surely relevant.
288. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right to Health Care, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1325, 1328 (2010).
289. President's Message to Congress on the State of the Union, 12 PUB. PAPERS 41 (Jan. 11,
1944).
290. Archbishop Dolan Outlines U.S. Bishops' Legislative 'Principles and Priorities'for New
Congress, TARGETED NEws SERV., Jan. 18, 2011.
291. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/ (last visited July 17, 2011).
292. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., Ist plen. Metg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); see also James A. Morone, The Bias of
American Politics: Rationing Health Care in a Weak State, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1923, 1926 (1992)
(noting that while the ideology of American exceptionalism has deep roots, "[t]here are other
legacies in American political history" as well, and that "anti-statist rhetoric failed to bury ...
social security, Medicare, protecting voting rights, business regulation, and water fluoridation").
As Professor Morone notes, "[t]he American fear of government matters, but it is only part of the
political story." Id. at 1927. The "skeptical view of government" reflected in American politics
has hindered agreements on health care policy, but, "[e]ven so, American political history is full
of great reforming battles that resulted in effective and popular programs." Id. at 1938. Professor
Barnett's story has a legitimate place in politics; for the Court to impose his story on the American
people would be profoundly illegitimate.
293. See, e.g., Karen Tumulty, Conservatives' New Focus: America, the Exceptional, WASH.
PosT, Nov. 29, 2010, at Al (claiming that "the idea that the United States is inherently superior to
the world's other nations has become the battle cry"); NEWT GINGRICH, A NATION LIKE No
OTHER: WHY AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM MATTERS 13 (2011) (noting that the book "is dedicated
to the proposition that American Exceptionalism is so central to our nation's survival that every
generation must learn why being an American is a unique and precious experience"). Yet, this
appears to be a very narrow version of American exceptionalism, considering that until a few
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from other countries is the minimal and fundamental nature of the duties
its citizens owe the state." 294 It takes a particularly narrow view of
American culture and history not to wonder why a legislative effort to
achieve universal health care is anathema to a minimalist approach to
government, simply because it requires many people to fund their medi-
cal costs through private health insurance rather than at the expense of
emergency providers or the state. But rather than confront the potential
bases that support a right to health care, Professor Barnett simply claims
that requiring individuals to purchase health insurance is not one of the
duties Americans recognize.29 5
Justice Holmes would know how to answer the claim that the Con-
stitution precludes a mandate to purchase health insurance. Dissenting in
Lochner v. New York, he stated:
[A] Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic the-
ory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to
the state or of laissez faire. It is made for people of fundamentally
differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natu-
ral and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude
our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them
conflict with the Constitution of the United States.296
The choice between American exceptionalism and health care as a fun-
damental right should be made by the people through their elected repre-
sentatives-not the courts.
In sum, judicial enforcement of both the Commerce Clause and the
Tenth Amendment is not directly about preserving individual liberty.
Professor Barnett's anti-commandeering argument misses this, leaving
his argument to be best understood as a continuation of the earlier-
uniformly rejected-efforts to use the Thirteenth Amendment to limit
congressional regulatory power in areas that have nothing to do with the
historical institution of slavery. The futility of these efforts cannot be
remedied by invoking the Necessary and Proper Clause or by drawing
analogies to the Tenth Amendment. A vague anti-commandeering prohi-
bition in relation to the scope of Congress's power to regulate individu-
als is fundamentally flawed and should be disregarded by the Supreme
Court.
years ago, many conservatives as well as liberals supported the mandate on the ground of
fostering personal responsibility rather than "free riding." See Ryan Lizza, Romney's Dilemma:
How His Greatest Achievement Has Become His Biggest Liability, THE NEW YORKER, June 6,
2011, at 40-41.
294. Barnett, supra note 5, at 631.
295. Id. at 631-34 (discussing the other recognized duties before cursorily concluding that
"with the individual mandate there is no traditionally recognized pre-existing duty").
296. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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B. The Substantive Due Process Right Challenge to
the Individual Mandate
If there were any basis for finding the individual mandate unconsti-
tutional, it would lie in a substantive due process right. The question has
been raised by the "buy and eat" broccoli argument-which should be
addressed cognizant of the separate distinctions between a mandate to
buy and to eat.2 97 The purpose of this section is not to provide an
exhaustive analysis of this issue, but rather to show that the answer is far
from certain.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida
was the first court to recognize the "Broccoli Revolution." 298 The court
reasoned that "Congress could require that people buy and consume
broccoli at regular intervals, not only because the required purchases
will positively impact interstate commerce, but also because people who
eat healthier tend to be healthier, and are thus more productive and put
less of a strain on the health care system."299 In support, the court refer-
enced Dean Chemerinsky's thoughts on the matter that "what people
choose to eat well might be regarded as a personal liberty." 00 The
assumption that Congress's power must hit a limit when it comes to
buying and eating broccoli rests on three basic misconceptions.
First, Congress is not going to make everyone buy and eat broccoli.
The moment a court loses sight of this fact, it trades constitutional law
for fantasy. Dissenting in Champion v. Ames from the Court's ruling that
Congress could ban the interstate transportation of foreign lottery tick-
ets, Chief Justice Fuller worried that the majority's holding meant that
Congress could now also regulate "[aln invitation to dine, or to take a
drive, or a note of introduction."o' The majority acknowledged the
power of Chief Justice Fuller's imagination, but politely dismissed its
utility as an interpretive device.302
297. See Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-CV-91-RV/
EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *24 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (noting claims made during oral
argument that "Congress could require that people buy and consume broccoli").
298. See Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of
Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 18-23 (2011) (labeling the issue as the "Broccoli
Revolution").
299. Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *24.
300. Id. (quoting Dean Chemerinsky).
301. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 371 (1903) (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 363 (noting that "[iut would not be difficult to imagine legislation that would be
justly liable" to the charge of arbitrariness, but "the possible abuse of a power is not an argument
against its existence"); id. (citing Chief Justice Marshall's admonition that the remedy to "unwise
or injurious" exercises of power encompassed by the Commerce Clause lies in the "wisdom and
the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their
constituents possess at elections") (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824));
see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 400 (1798) (Iredell, J., concurring) ("It is not
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Second, arguments in favor of a right to not be required to eat broc-
coli-a right that ought to be considered separately from a duty to
purchase it-do have some plausibility, given that what an individual
eats is often a highly personal choice, but the case is far from open and
shut. This personal choice has been protected when certain dietary
prohibitions are derived from religious beliefs. 0 Further, an individual
has a right to refuse unwanted medical care. 30 However, no right is
absolute. The Takings Clause illustrates that the right to property is not
absolute.3 05 The government surely has the power to regulate the pro-
duction and sale of food with an end to discouraging consumption of
some foods and encouraging the consumption of others-as in anti-
obesity campaigns.306 Washington v. Glucksbergo7 shows that individu-
als do not have absolute rights to access medicines or medical treatment.
Further, Jacobson v. MassachusettS308 shows that the right to decline
medical treatment is not absolute.
At times, involuntary conduct-mandates-can actually serve lib-
erty rights by addressing collective action problems. For example, the
involuntary sale of property through eminent domain can remedy the
problem of bilateral monopolies in which two owners are unable to
come to an agreement through private bargaining. 0 9 The individual
mandate in Massachusetts addressed, among other issues, "obvious col-
lective action problems," which would have prevented a greater amount
of the public from living their lives as they may wish.310 Just as the
individual mandate would require those non-exempt citizens to purchase
sufficient to urge, that the power may be abused, for, such is the nature of all power, such is the
tendency of every human institution . . . . We must be content to limit power where we can, and
where we cannot, consistently with its use, we must be content to repose a salutary confidence.").
303. See United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (holding that the
government must accommodate an ordained orthodox rabbi prisoner's kosher diet).
304. See Cruzan v. Mo., Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that the government
must recognize the personal choice to not be kept on life support).
305. See Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 469 (2005) (noting that "[tihe Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that
private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation' ").
306. See Paul A. Diller & Samantha Graff, Regulating Food Retail for Obesity Prevention:
How Far Can Cities Go?, 39 J.L. MED. & ETmics 89 (2011) (surveying retail food regulations
intended to aid anti-obesity campaigns).
307. 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (upholding a statute banning assisted suicide).
308. 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (upholding mandatory vaccinations as a part of the state's "police
powers"). Even though there is no current federal law that requires vaccination, every state
requires children receive certain vaccinations before entering public school. See Vaccines: Vac-
Gen/Laws/State Requirements, CTRS, FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 7, 2010), http://
www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/laws/state-reqs.htm.
309. See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 208, at 27-32.
310. See Balkin, Commerce, supra note 12, at 46 (noting that "[p]eople with health problems
will have incentives to move to a state where they cannot be turned down, raising health care costs
for everyone, while insurers will prefer to do business in states where they can avoid more
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health insurance, thereby promoting vindication of what some might
regard as a fundamental right to health care, vaccinations mandated by
the State force those individuals to purchase a form of health care, with a
collective benefit that might well not be obtained if vaccinations were
left entirely to individual choice. In short, all that can be said is that
there might be some case to either side of the Broccoli Revolution, but it
is far from automatic.
Third, arguments against a mandate to purchase broccoli would be
asserting an economic liberty under substantive due process. The
Supreme Court took this route with Allgeyer v. Louisiana3 1 ' and Loch-
ner v. New York.312 The first case brought to the Supreme Court to inter-
pret the word "liberty" in the Due Process Clause was Allgeyer.313 There
the Court described the protected liberty as:
not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical
restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but [also] . . . the right of
the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to
use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn
his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avo-
cation; and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful
conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
In Lochner, the Court struck down a state law limiting working hours on
the basis of the freedom of contract. 15 However, the Supreme Court
brought the Lochner era to an end in the 1930s with Nebbia v. New
York3 16 and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish." Justice Scalia recently
observed that the Court has "held for many years (logically or not) that
the 'liberties' protected by Substantive Due Process do not include eco-
nomic liberties."s18 Doing so now, he added, would be a step of "great[ ]
novelty."3 19 To be sure, Justice Kennedy was prepared to take that step
in the context of property rights.3 20 If one gives in to the impulse to
expensive patients with pre-existing conditions, and younger and healthier people may leave for
jurisdictions where they can avoid paying for health insurance").
311. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
312. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
313. Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 590-91 (holding that liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment was
economic liberty).
314. Id. at 589.
315. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 60 (discussing the "protection of the Federal Constitution from
undue interference with liberty of person and freedom of contract").
316. 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (upholding price regulations of milk).
317. 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding minimum wage regulations for women and minors).
318. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Env't Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2606
(2010) (plurality opinion).
319. Id.
320. Id. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If a judicial decision, as opposed to an act of the
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fantasize, a statute requiring everyone to purchase broccoli could present
a circumstance where something like an economic substantive due pro-
cess right might have some merit. If Congress ever enacts such a statute,
there will be "time enough" for the Court to decide what the Constitu-
tion says about it.32 1
Once again, this note does not present a full analysis of the claim
that there is a substantive due process right to not purchase health insur-
ance. What is relevant for discussion is simply that the existence of such
a right is, at best, contestable. In turn, this makes it all the more impor-
tant to address the question forthrightly-rather than smuggle it into the
analysis under the guise of the Commerce Clause or the Tenth
Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
The Commerce Clause provides that Congress may: "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." 322 Powers granted under the Commerce Clause have
varied vastly from regulating all intercourse,323 to only items having a
direct effect on interstate commerce, 324 to intrastate activities that would
have a substantial economic effect in the aggregate,3 25 and to intrastate
activities that would undercut a broader regulatory scheme.326
Despite these changes, all of these distinctions were determined in
accordance with principles of federalism. 327 Under a system of dual fed-
executive or the legislature, eliminates an established property right, the judgment could be set
aside as a deprivation of property without due process of law.").
321. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 362 (1903) ("It will be time enough to consider the
constitutionality of such legislation when we must do so. The present case does not require the
court to declare the full extent of the power that Congress may exercise in the regulation of
commerce among the states.").
322. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
323. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 222 (1824) (holding that the Commerce Clause
provides Congress with the power to regulate "intercourse").
324. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895) (holding that the Commerce
Clause does not provide Congress with the power to stop a monopoly in the sugar refining
industry because manufacturing has an indirect effect on commerce).
325. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. Ill, 126 (1942) (holding that the Commerce Clause
provides Congress with the power to regulate intrastate wheat grown and consumed because of the
substantial economic effects this would have had on the market price of wheat in the aggregate).
326. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 41-42 (2005) (holding that the Commerce Clause provides
Congress with the power to regulate home-grown marijuana in order to maintain the efficacy of
the Controlled Substances Act).
327. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114-15 (1941) (noting that "[sluch regulation
is not a forbidden invasion of a state power merely because either its motive or its consequence is
to restrict the use of articles of commerce within the states"). This illustrates the idea that the aim
of the Commerce Clause is to maintain an appropriate federal-state balance and to prevent the
federal government from overwhelming the states.
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eralism, there are "two distinct and discemable lines of political
accountability: one between the citizens and the Federal Government;
the second between the citizens and the States."328 These lines require
the balancing between the levels of power and interaction between the
state and federal governments.3 29 The Court's interpretation of the Com-
merce Clause has frequently been narrowed or expanded in order to
maintain this balance. 330 Achieving the right balance has always been a
challenge to the institutional capacity of the Court.3 '
The federal courts should not make this challenge even more com-
plex by introducing a new element into Commerce Clause analysis: the
direct protection of liberty rights. Of course, the protection of federalism
may well promote individual liberty indirectly, to the extent that a
divided government may be less able to intrude comprehensively into
individual rights. But protection of individual liberty has never been a
direct concern of the Commerce Clause.
There are two reasons for rejecting the interjection of a new dimen-
sion to Commerce Clause analysis. First, the balance in power between
the federal government and the states has been achieved only through a
grueling evolution in Commerce Clause doctrine, and there is an
"immense stake in [its] stability."3 32 Granted, the judiciary's responsibil-
ity to "expound and interpret" the law can include modification of the
law over time, as has happened with the Commerce Clause in the
past. Any such change, however, should not be adopted without the
most compelling of reasons.
Second, it would be a major mistake for the courts to strike down
the individual mandate on the basis of importing a new liberty right into
the Commerce Clause. The question is not one of getting health care
policy right, but of respecting Congress's primary role in determining
the degree of federal involvement needed. The PPACA represents a
determination that a major national problem-access to health care-
requires a national solution, and that the solution can work only under
conditions in which everyone has health insurance. It further represents
a determination that achieving this aim through the market, rather than
328. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 576-77 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
329. See Balkin, Commerce, supra note 12, at I ("Properly understood, the commerce power
authorizes Congress to regulate problems or activities that produce spillover effects between states
or generate collective action problems that concern more than one state.").
330. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568-74 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
331. Id. at 579 ("The substantial element of political judgment in Commerce Clause matters
leaves our institutional capacity to intervene more in doubt than when we decide cases, for
instance, under the Bill of Rights even though clear and bright lines are often absent in the latter
class of disputes.").
332. Id. at 574.
333. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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through a direct government provision of health care, is the best
approach. Congress's power over a multi-billion dollar market in private
health insurance that impacts every United States citizen is clearly
within well-settled and principled Commerce Clause doctrine.
The federal courts must be mindful that responsibility for defending
the United States's integral system of dual federalism does not fall
solely on the judiciary. Structural elements of the Constitution create a
separation of powers and a system of checks and balances.3 34 The truth
is, "[w]hatever the judicial role, it is axiomatic that Congress does have
substantial discretion and control over the federal balance."33 This
alone-not misplaced liberty rights-is sufficient. Judicial attempts to
strike down the individual mandate through these liberty arguments
masquerading as Commerce Clause claims will have longer lasting
implications on future Commerce Clause analysis than any type of
health care reform ever would. The constitutionality of the individual
mandate provision of the PPACA should not be a close question. The
Supreme Court should respect its proper role under the Constitution and
uphold the mandate.
334. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
335. Id. at 577.
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